University of Hertfordshire

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A Certeza Fulcral de Wittgenstein

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Original languageEnglish
Number of pages28
Pages (from-to)3-30
JournalDissertatio: Revista de Filosofia
Journal publication date1 Jun 2015
Volume1
IssueSpecial issue
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2015

Abstract

This paper works on the assumption that much of On Certainty is devoted to fleshing out the distinction between certainty and knowledge. Our basic certainties – or 'hinge certainties', or 'hinges' – make up our world picture and underpin knowledge, not being themselves, however, of an epistemic nature. Wittgenstein's deliberations in On Certainty show him to realize that our basic certainties share the following conceptual features; they are all: nonepistemic, indubitable, nonempirical, grammatical, nonpropositional, ineffable, enacted and foundational. The necessary features of hinges are discussed at some length in the paper.

Notes

The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in Dissertatio Revista de Filosofia, Vol 1 Special Issue pp 3-30, and is available on line at https://periodicos.ufpel.edu.br/ojs2/index.php/dissertatio/article/view/8563/5586 © 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

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