University of Hertfordshire

By the same authors

Are Reasons Like Shampoo?

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Standard

Are Reasons Like Shampoo? / Sandis, Constantine.

Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography: Causal and Teleological Approaches . ed. / Gunnar Schumann. Routledge, 2019.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Harvard

Sandis, C 2019, Are Reasons Like Shampoo? in G Schumann (ed.), Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography: Causal and Teleological Approaches . Routledge.

APA

Sandis, C. (2019). Are Reasons Like Shampoo? In G. Schumann (Ed.), Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography: Causal and Teleological Approaches Routledge.

Vancouver

Sandis C. Are Reasons Like Shampoo? In Schumann G, editor, Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography: Causal and Teleological Approaches . Routledge. 2019

Author

Sandis, Constantine. / Are Reasons Like Shampoo?. Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography: Causal and Teleological Approaches . editor / Gunnar Schumann. Routledge, 2019.

Bibtex

@inbook{2ae74f8a2db74fa0a2ce51560ffad08f,
title = "Are Reasons Like Shampoo?",
abstract = "This essay considers various constraints placed by philosophers on what they take to be a shared concept of a reason for action. I try to show that these constraints are incompatible with one another, proceeding to argue that we would therefore do better to embrace a conceptual pluralism. On such a pluralism, there is no such thing as the concept of a reason for action. Interminable debates about the nature of reasons for action arise precisely because no single thing called a 'reason for action' can perform all the varying functions that philosophers require of it. As with products such as three-in-one shampoos, each individual function is performed at the expense of others. Unlike such stuffs, however, some of the desired functions of reasons cannot be combined at all. I conclude that neither disjunctivist nor anti-disjunctivist accounts of reasons for action are capable of providing a unifying account of them.",
author = "Constantine Sandis",
year = "2019",
language = "English",
editor = "Schumann, {Gunnar }",
booktitle = "Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography: Causal and Teleological Approaches",
publisher = "Routledge",
address = "United States",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Are Reasons Like Shampoo?

AU - Sandis, Constantine

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - This essay considers various constraints placed by philosophers on what they take to be a shared concept of a reason for action. I try to show that these constraints are incompatible with one another, proceeding to argue that we would therefore do better to embrace a conceptual pluralism. On such a pluralism, there is no such thing as the concept of a reason for action. Interminable debates about the nature of reasons for action arise precisely because no single thing called a 'reason for action' can perform all the varying functions that philosophers require of it. As with products such as three-in-one shampoos, each individual function is performed at the expense of others. Unlike such stuffs, however, some of the desired functions of reasons cannot be combined at all. I conclude that neither disjunctivist nor anti-disjunctivist accounts of reasons for action are capable of providing a unifying account of them.

AB - This essay considers various constraints placed by philosophers on what they take to be a shared concept of a reason for action. I try to show that these constraints are incompatible with one another, proceeding to argue that we would therefore do better to embrace a conceptual pluralism. On such a pluralism, there is no such thing as the concept of a reason for action. Interminable debates about the nature of reasons for action arise precisely because no single thing called a 'reason for action' can perform all the varying functions that philosophers require of it. As with products such as three-in-one shampoos, each individual function is performed at the expense of others. Unlike such stuffs, however, some of the desired functions of reasons cannot be combined at all. I conclude that neither disjunctivist nor anti-disjunctivist accounts of reasons for action are capable of providing a unifying account of them.

M3 - Chapter

BT - Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography: Causal and Teleological Approaches

A2 - Schumann, Gunnar

PB - Routledge

ER -