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Collusive Decisions and Punishment under Demand and Cost Uncertainty. / Amountzias, Chrysovalantis.

University of Hertfordshire, 2016. (UH Business School Working paper).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Amountzias, C 2016 'Collusive Decisions and Punishment under Demand and Cost Uncertainty' UH Business School Working paper, University of Hertfordshire.

APA

Amountzias, C. (2016). Collusive Decisions and Punishment under Demand and Cost Uncertainty. (UH Business School Working paper). University of Hertfordshire.

Vancouver

Amountzias C. Collusive Decisions and Punishment under Demand and Cost Uncertainty. University of Hertfordshire. 2016. (UH Business School Working paper).

Author

Amountzias, Chrysovalantis. / Collusive Decisions and Punishment under Demand and Cost Uncertainty. University of Hertfordshire, 2016. (UH Business School Working paper).

Bibtex

@techreport{a4e9fd60ee6b439197ea26072eca7b6b,
title = "Collusive Decisions and Punishment under Demand and Cost Uncertainty",
abstract = "This paper provides a wider approach to competitive behaviour in sectors affected by a slump in demand, based on the contribution of the original paper by Green and Porter (1984). In addition to the cooperative solution where firms may enter a reversionary episode without breaking the collusion, the model of this study takes into consideration two forms of punishment as a result of future uncertainty; a total breakdown in collusion if there is no trust between its participants; or the formation of a new one by charging a lower common price as a disciplinary act. It is shown that under demand and cost uncertainty firms may have the incentives to choose a different short-run solution compared to the solution under certainty.",
author = "Chrysovalantis Amountzias",
note = "Copyright and all rights therein are retained by the authors. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and conditions invoked by each author's copyright. These works may not be re-posted without the explicit permission of the copyright holders.",
year = "2016",
language = "English",
series = "UH Business School Working paper",
publisher = "University of Hertfordshire",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "University of Hertfordshire",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Collusive Decisions and Punishment under Demand and Cost Uncertainty

AU - Amountzias, Chrysovalantis

N1 - Copyright and all rights therein are retained by the authors. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and conditions invoked by each author's copyright. These works may not be re-posted without the explicit permission of the copyright holders.

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - This paper provides a wider approach to competitive behaviour in sectors affected by a slump in demand, based on the contribution of the original paper by Green and Porter (1984). In addition to the cooperative solution where firms may enter a reversionary episode without breaking the collusion, the model of this study takes into consideration two forms of punishment as a result of future uncertainty; a total breakdown in collusion if there is no trust between its participants; or the formation of a new one by charging a lower common price as a disciplinary act. It is shown that under demand and cost uncertainty firms may have the incentives to choose a different short-run solution compared to the solution under certainty.

AB - This paper provides a wider approach to competitive behaviour in sectors affected by a slump in demand, based on the contribution of the original paper by Green and Porter (1984). In addition to the cooperative solution where firms may enter a reversionary episode without breaking the collusion, the model of this study takes into consideration two forms of punishment as a result of future uncertainty; a total breakdown in collusion if there is no trust between its participants; or the formation of a new one by charging a lower common price as a disciplinary act. It is shown that under demand and cost uncertainty firms may have the incentives to choose a different short-run solution compared to the solution under certainty.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - UH Business School Working paper

BT - Collusive Decisions and Punishment under Demand and Cost Uncertainty

PB - University of Hertfordshire

ER -