University of Hertfordshire

Consciousness and conceptual schema

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

  • D. Hutto
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Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDimensions of Conscious Experience
EditorsP. Pllykkanen
PublisherJohn Benjamins Publishing Company
Pages15-43
ISBN (Print)978-1588111258
Publication statusPublished - 2001

Publication series

NameAdvances in Consciousness Research Series
PublisherJohn Benjamins

Abstract

There are two importantly different ways in which consciousness resists incorporation into our familiar object-based conceptual schema which, when analysed, help to explain why it is regarded as such a philosophically recalcitrant phenomena. One concerns the nonconceptual nature of basic forms of conscious experience, the other concerns the fact that attempts to understand the nature of such experience in an object-based schema, as is demanded by some forms of physicalism, is inappropriate. My concern in this paper is to show how certain central problems concerning our attempts to understand consciousness can be recast or dissolved if we take note of these aspects of phenomenal experience.

Notes

Full text of this chapter is not available in the UHRA

ID: 187873