University of Hertfordshire

By the same authors

Faith, Belief and Fictionalism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Documents

View graph of relations
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)257-274
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Journal publication date27 Dec 2017
Volume98
IssueS1
Early online date5 Aug 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 27 Dec 2017

Abstract

Is propositional religious faith constituted by belief? Recent debate hasfocussed on whether faith may be constituted by a positive non-doxastic cognitivestate, which can stand in place of belief. This article sets out and defends thedoxastic theory. We consider and reject three arguments commonly used infavour of non-doxastic theories of faith: (1) the argument from religious doubt;(2) the use of ‘faith’ in linguistic utterances; and (3) the possibility of pragmaticfaith. We argue that belief is required to maintain a distinction between genuinefaith, pretend faith, and fictionalist faith.

Notes

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Finlay Malcolm and Michael Scott, ‘Faith, Belief and Fictionalism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, December 2017, which has been published in final form at DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12169. Under embargo until 5 August 2018. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

ID: 12584082