University of Hertfordshire

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How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox

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  • Mark Pinder
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Original languageEnglish
Number of pages20
Pages (from-to)1-20
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Journal publication date20 May 2017
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 20 May 2017

Abstract

The general thesis of this paper is that metasemantic theories can play a central role in determining the correct solution to the liar paradox. I argue for the thesis by providing a specific example. I show how Lewis’s reference-magnetic metasemantic theory may decide between two of the most influential solutions to the liar paradox: Kripke’s minimal fixed point theory of truth and Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth. In particular, I suggest that Lewis’s metasemantic theory favours Kripke’s solution to the paradox over Gupta and Belnap’s. I then sketch how other standard criteria for assessing solutions to the liar paradox, such as whether a solution faces a so-called revenge paradox, fit into this picture. While the discussion of the specific example is itself important, the underlying lesson is that we have an unused strategy for resolving one of the hardest problems in philosophy.

Notes

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Mark Pinder, ‘How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox’, Philosophical Studies, May 2017. Under embargo. Embargo end date: 20 May 2018. The final publication is available at Springer via https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-017-0928-z.

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