University of Hertfordshire

Mental representation and consciousness

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEntry for encyclopedia/dictionary

  • D. Hutto
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Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEncyclopedia of Consciousness
PublisherAcademic Press
ISBN (Print)978-0-12-373864-6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Abstract

Intentionality and consciousness are the fundamental kinds of mental phenomena. Although they are widely regarded as being entirely distinct some philosophers conjecture that they are intimately related. Prominently it has been claimed that consciousness can be best understood in terms of representational facts or properties. Representationalist theories vary in strength. At their core they seek to establish that subjective, phenomenal consciousness (of the kind that involves the having of first-personal points of view or perspectives on the world – perspectives that incorporate experiences with specific phenomenal characters) is either exhausted by, or supervenes on, capacities for mental representation. These proposals face several serious objections.

Notes

Full contents available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/referenceworks/9780123738738 Copyright Elsevier Ltd. DOI: 10.1016/B978-012373873-8.00050-5 [Full text of this chapter is not available in the UHRA]

ID: 187505