University of Hertfordshire

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Metaphysics and the representational fallacy

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Original languageEnglish
Number of pages5
Pages (from-to)1157-1161
JournalMind
Journal publication dateOct 2010
Volume119
Issue476
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2010

Abstract

The message is clear: ‘[I]t is a fallacy to argue from facts about language to conclusions about the fundamental nature of reality, one that is widely committed’ (p. 1). Philosophers who adopt this methodology commit what Dyke calls the ‘representional fallacy’. The primary concern of metaphysics should be the investigation not of language but of reality.

Notes

Original article can be found at: http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/ Copyright Oxford University Press [Full text of this article is not available in the UHRA]

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