University of Hertfordshire

By the same authors

More security or less insecurity (transcript of discussion)

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Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSecurity Protocols XVIII
EditorsB. Christianson, J. Malcolm
PublisherSpringer-Verlag, (Berlin-Heidelberg)
Pages120-126
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-662-45921-8
ISBN (Print)9783662459201
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Event18th International Workshop Security Protocols - Cambridge, United Kingdom
Duration: 24 Mar 201026 Mar 2010

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7061
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference18th International Workshop Security Protocols
CountryUnited Kingdom
CityCambridge
Period24/03/1026/03/10

Abstract

The purpose of this talk is to explore the possibility of an exploitable analogy between approaches to secure system design and theories of jurisprudence. The prevailing theory of jurisprudence in the West at the moment goes back to Hobbes. It was developed by Immanuel Kant and later by Rousseau, and is sometimes called the contractarian model after Rousseau’s idea of the social contract. It’s not the sort of contract that you look at and think, oh gosh, that might be nice, I might think about opting in to that, it’s more like a pop up licence agreement that says, do you want to comply with this contract, or would you rather be an outlaw. So you don’t get a lot of choice about it. Sometimes the same theory, flying the flag of Immanuel Kant, is called transcendental institutionalism, because the basic approach says, you identify the legal institutions that in a perfect world would govern society, and then you look at the processes and procedures, the protocols that everyone should follow in order to enable those institutions to work, and then you say, right, that can’t be transcended, so therefore there’s a moral imperative for everyone to do it. So this model doesn’t pay any attention to the actual society that emerges, or to the incentives that these processes actually place on various people to act in a particular way. It doesn’t look at any interaction effects, it simply says, well you have to behave in this particular way because that’s what the law says you have to do, and the law is the law, and anybody who doesn’t behave in that way is a criminal, or (in our terms) is an attacker

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