University of Hertfordshire

By the same authors

Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPerception, Cognition and Aesthetics
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherRoutledge
Pages227-252
Number of pages26
ISBN (Electronic)9780429870286
ISBN (Print)9781138615939
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 29 Apr 2019

Abstract

In the philosophy of mind, revelation is the claim that the nature of qualia is revealed in phenomenal experience. In the literature, revelation is often thought of as intuitive but in tension with physicalism. While mentions of revelation are frequent, there is room for further discussion of how precisely to formulate the thesis of revelation and what it exactly amounts to. Drawing on the work of David Lewis, this chapter provides a detailed discussion on how the thesis of revelation, as well as its incompatibility with physicalism, is to be understood.

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