University of Hertfordshire

By the same authors

The Animal in Epistemology: Wittgenstein's Enactivist Solution to the Problem of Regress

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

View graph of relations
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationHinge Epistemology
EditorsAnnalisa Coliva, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock
PublisherBRILL
Pages24
Number of pages47
ISBN (Print)9789004332379
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2016

Abstract

In this paper I briefly summarize the nature of Wittgenstein's 'hinge certainties', showing how they radically differ from traditional basic beliefs in their being nonepistemic, grammatical, nonpropositional and enacted. I claim that it is these very features that enable hinge certainties to put a logical stop to justification, and thereby solve the regress problem of basic beliefs. This is a ground-breaking achievement – worthy of calling On Certainty Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece'. As I go along, I question some differing interpretations and respond to some objections from fellow-readers of On Certainty: Duncan Pritchard, Michael Williams and Crispin Wright.

Notes

Chapter in Hinge Epistemology, Coliva A. and Moyal-Sharrock, D., 2016, Leiden: Brill, ISBN: 9789004332379

ID: 10715657