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Original languageEnglish
Number of pages23
Pages (from-to)97-119
JournalInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Journal publication date23 May 2016
Volume6
Issue2-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 23 May 2016

Abstract

In this paper I briefly summarize the nature of Wittgenstein's 'hinge certainties', showing how they radically differ from traditional basic beliefs in their being nonepistemic, grammatical, nonpropositional and enacted. I claim that it is these very features that enable hinge certainties to put a logical stop to justification, and thereby solve the regress problem of basic beliefs. This is a ground-breaking achievement – worthy of calling On Certainty Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece'. As I go along, I question some differing interpretations and respond to some objections from fellow-readers of On Certainty: Duncan Pritchard, Michael Williams and Crispin Wright.

Notes

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism following peer review. Subject to embargo, embargo end date: 23 May 2017. The version of record [ (October 2016) 6 (2-3): 97-119. First published online October, 2016] is available online at doi: 10.1163/22105700-00603003

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