University of Hertfordshire

Understanding fictional minds without theory of mind!

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Standard

Understanding fictional minds without theory of mind! / Hutto, D.

In: Style, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2011, p. 276-282.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Hutto, D 2011, 'Understanding fictional minds without theory of mind!', Style, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 276-282.

APA

Vancouver

Author

Hutto, D. / Understanding fictional minds without theory of mind!. In: Style. 2011 ; Vol. 45, No. 2. pp. 276-282.

Bibtex

@article{4ab357a121ff4d76828802b68259395c,
title = "Understanding fictional minds without theory of mind!",
abstract = "This paper explores the idea that when dealing with certain kinds of narratives, ‘like it or not’, consumers of fiction will bring the same sorts of skills (or at least a subset of them) to bear that they use when dealing with actual minds. Let us call this the ‘Same Resources Thesis’. I believe the ‘Same Resources Thesis’ is true. But this is because I defend the view that engaging in narrative practices is the normal developmental route through which children acquire the capacity to make sense of what it is to act for a reason. If so, narratives are what provide crucial resources for dealing with actual minds – at least those of a certain sophisticated sort. I argue however that to the extent that we mindread at all, it is likely that we – i.e. those with the appropriate linguistically scaffolded abilities to make mental attributions – rely on our basic mind minding capacities to do so. So theory only comes into play when we mind guess, but theory of mind doesn’t come into it at all, neither when we deal with actual or fictional minds.",
author = "D. Hutto",
note = "Original article can be found at : http://www.style.niu.edu/ Copyright Northern Illinois University",
year = "2011",
language = "English",
volume = "45",
pages = "276--282",
journal = "Style",
issn = "0039-4238",
publisher = "Northern Illinois University, Department of English",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Understanding fictional minds without theory of mind!

AU - Hutto, D.

N1 - Original article can be found at : http://www.style.niu.edu/ Copyright Northern Illinois University

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - This paper explores the idea that when dealing with certain kinds of narratives, ‘like it or not’, consumers of fiction will bring the same sorts of skills (or at least a subset of them) to bear that they use when dealing with actual minds. Let us call this the ‘Same Resources Thesis’. I believe the ‘Same Resources Thesis’ is true. But this is because I defend the view that engaging in narrative practices is the normal developmental route through which children acquire the capacity to make sense of what it is to act for a reason. If so, narratives are what provide crucial resources for dealing with actual minds – at least those of a certain sophisticated sort. I argue however that to the extent that we mindread at all, it is likely that we – i.e. those with the appropriate linguistically scaffolded abilities to make mental attributions – rely on our basic mind minding capacities to do so. So theory only comes into play when we mind guess, but theory of mind doesn’t come into it at all, neither when we deal with actual or fictional minds.

AB - This paper explores the idea that when dealing with certain kinds of narratives, ‘like it or not’, consumers of fiction will bring the same sorts of skills (or at least a subset of them) to bear that they use when dealing with actual minds. Let us call this the ‘Same Resources Thesis’. I believe the ‘Same Resources Thesis’ is true. But this is because I defend the view that engaging in narrative practices is the normal developmental route through which children acquire the capacity to make sense of what it is to act for a reason. If so, narratives are what provide crucial resources for dealing with actual minds – at least those of a certain sophisticated sort. I argue however that to the extent that we mindread at all, it is likely that we – i.e. those with the appropriate linguistically scaffolded abilities to make mental attributions – rely on our basic mind minding capacities to do so. So theory only comes into play when we mind guess, but theory of mind doesn’t come into it at all, neither when we deal with actual or fictional minds.

M3 - Article

VL - 45

SP - 276

EP - 282

JO - Style

JF - Style

SN - 0039-4238

IS - 2

ER -