University of Hertfordshire

By the same authors

Wittgenstein on Psychological Certainty

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPerspicuous Presentations
Subtitle of host publicationEssays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology
EditorsDaniele Moyal-Sharrock
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan
Pages211-35
ISBN (Print)0230527485, 978-0230527485
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Abstract

As is well-known, Wittgenstein pointed out an asymmetry between first- and third-person psychological statements: the latter, unlike the former, involve observation or a claim to knowledge, and are therefore constitutionally open to uncertainty. In this paper, I challenge this asymmetry by challenging the constitutional uncertainty of third-person psychological sentences, and argue that Wittgenstein ultimately also did. There are cases where third-person psychological ascriptions are not susceptible of error.

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