

between Wiggins's own work and Tarski's famous Convention T and Moore concentrating on Wiggins's notion of a vindictory explanation. Edward Hussey and Cheryl Misak discuss the latter task, with Hussey concentrating on Plato and Protagoras and Misak concentrating on issues relating to pragmatism, holism and empiricism.

The quality of the papers in this volume is generally good, and in his Replies Wiggins is honest, open-minded, and more than willing to restate, refashion, and develop further his views on the various topics which the contributors discuss. Philosophers interested in Wiggins's views on these topics will find the Replies interesting and enlightening. There is also some (perhaps unintentional?) humour. Witness paragraph §48 from the Replies:

There is something disturbing in the fact that over several years McDowell and I were in a position to talk to one another about whatever we liked on almost any day of the week, yet I still misunderstood him. (p. 258).

What hope is there for the rest of us?

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## METAPHYSICS

### *Self and World*

By QUASSIM CASSAM

Oxford University Press, 1997. viii + 208 pp. £30.00

*Self and World* is an attempt to provide and assess arguments for materialism about self-consciousness. This is not an ontological thesis, rather it is the claim that in some sense "self-consciousness requires awareness of oneself *qua* subject as shaped, located and solid" (p. 117). Importantly, the qualifying 'some sense' leaves room for unpacking in terms of a *conception* of oneself as a physical object or merely an *intuitive awareness* of oneself as such. Taking note of this crucial distinction, which he uses to good effect, Cassam's book makes a sober, sustained case for this thesis by relying on three complementary arguments which strike from several directions at once. Following in the footsteps of Kant and Strawson, these arguments, which comprise the three central chapters of the book, are all transcendental in form.

First, the Objectivity Argument claims that in order to be self-conscious a subject must be able to think of its experiences as including perceptions of objects in the weighty sense (of existing unperceived). Thus, the argument is designed to show that to be in such a position it is necessary that the subject is aware of itself, *qua* subject of experience, as a physical object in the sense of being shaped, located and solid.

Second, the Unity Argument claims that in order to be self-conscious a subject must be capable of self-ascribing different experiences at different times. This requires unitary awareness of that to which the experiences are ascribed. And it is claimed that a necessary condition on the possibility of

such awareness is that the subject has a capacity for experience of objects in the weighty sense. This requires being able to draw a distinction between 'how things appear' and 'how things are', which in turn, Cassam argues, requires the capacity to distinguish 'how things appear to me'.

Finally, the Identity Argument sets out to establish that awareness of oneself as a physical object is a necessary condition of being aware of one's own identity as the subject of different experiences. In order to be self-conscious a subject must, in some sense, conceive of itself as a spatio-temporally located continuant—a locus for the ascription of thought contents and experiences. This, allegedly, requires awareness of oneself as belonging to the category: physical object.

The subtle differences in the arguments of this triad is largely based on their *direction* of flow and the kind of support they lend to one another. As Cassam notes, the Identity Argument is meant to generate the initial premise of the Objectivity argument as a conclusion. Hence, it lends explanatory support to the first argument. Likewise, the Unity Argument raises questions about the conditions required for self-ascription which the Identity Argument is meant to supply. It is by firing several arrows at once that Cassam hopes to bring down his prey. Even philosophers who are generally suspicious of transcendental arguments will find him a sensitive sparring partner. His tendency is to err on the side of caution and his treatment is, on the whole, extremely fair.

Nevertheless, I would like to raise a concern about the overall success of his project. Cassam's primary targets are Kantian, or Wittgensteinian, philosophers who claim that selves are purely formal or logical and Cartesians who regard them as non-physical but substantial. The line he advances against the formalists is that self-referring thoughts must be located or anchored in the world by some means. His line against the Cartesians is that in order to sensibly ascribe thoughts and experiences we need to know what kind of thing to which they can be sensibly ascribed. Since thoughts and experiences must be located, and cannot be ascribed to a mere body, we must suppose that they are ascribed to a person and not an immaterial substance. By this reasoning we are driven towards the conclusion that persons must fall under the category of 'physical object'. But, even accepting the force of Cassam's arguments, there is room to accept that persons form a basic, irreducible ontological category distinct from that of physical objects but which nevertheless have the feature of being spatio-temporal continuants. On such a view it would be a necessary condition for self-consciousness that we are aware of ourselves as spatio-temporal continuants but not thereby physical objects *per se*. This is an important option given Cassam's own reasons for scepticism about reductionism and in light of normative issues concerning the ascription (and self-ascription of thoughts) which would make persons peculiarly unique amongst the class of physical objects (if in that class at all).

On a final, more general, note, my view is that while transcendental arguments are both philosophically instructive and necessary they can only take us so far. For example, some of the issues raised in the book concerning

the plausibility of certain idealist or materialist conceptions of the self take us away from the security of transcendental arguments and into the messy realm of speculation and theorising. Cassam's admirable concern for rigour causes him to shy away from such speculation. Perhaps he recognises that it is here that monsters lie. But attempting to slay such monsters is a vital part of the philosophical enterprise. With respect to self-consciousness Cassam's book both prepares us for this adventure and gives us good incentive to take it on.

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*Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of 'New Logic'*  
By STEPHEN H. PHILLIPS  
Open Court, 1995. xii + 391 pp.

Interest in classical Indian philosophy is still an esoteric pursuit among analytical philosophers, and Indian philosophy is commonly dismissed as more theology than philosophy, or at most having about as much philosophical use as Hegelian idealism. It is understandable why this should be. Apart from the quite brilliant work of authorities like the late lamented Bimal Matilal (see, for example, his *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge* (Oxford University Press, 1986)), a friend at Oxford of Dummett and Strawson, presentations of Indian philosophy have tended to concentrate on aspects of their field which, for various historical reasons, Indian scholars with a Western-style education themselves have tended to admire, precisely those forms associated directly with a spiritual path and very often with some superficial similarity to Western idealism. As idealism became less popular in Western philosophical circles under the influence of, *inter alia* Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein so any interest in Indian philosophy faded among the mainstream tradition at least in Anglo-American philosophy.

And yet it cannot be stressed enough how unreasonable and one-sided this vision of Indian philosophy is. On the one hand, in recent years philosophers with a training in analytic philosophy have returned with renewed interest to Hegelian and other forms of Western idealism, and also the application of the tools of contemporary analytic philosophy in the philosophy of religion has reached new heights of sophistication and interest. On the other hand in studying the history of philosophy particularly important in recent years has been the study of classical and mediaeval philosophy by those with a training in analytic philosophy as well as the relevant linguistic abilities. This broadening of interest by analytic philosophers—and perhaps greater humility—has been of immense importance in the development of contemporary philosophy. For many years Aristotle was dismissed except by a small number of neo-scholastics, yet the influence of Aristotle on the contemporary discussion of, for instance, substance, or virtue ethics, is obvious and well-known. Similarly Hellenistic philosophy, and particularly mediaeval philosophy, have been seen as eras of philosophical nit-picking, decadence, or—perhaps worst of all—merely spiritual or religious interest, and yet now careful textual study by those with a training in analytic philosophy is

revealing the great depths and real philosophical contribution they have to offer. Inasmuch as there is often a tendency for philosophical problems to arise out of or mirror grammatical categories, it should be obvious that the interest to be found in Greek and Latin philosophy may also be found in philosophy preserved in Sanskrit, the other great classical Indo-European language and the language of most classical Indian philosophy. And it should be made clear once and for all: Philosophical discussion in India over three and a half millennia is by no means *all* about religion, salvation, or idealism. There are here extensive discussions of all the topics which interest contemporary analytic philosophers, from abstract entities, and action, to validity, and verification, and bags of interesting material on truth, perception, induction, and particularly language and meaning. And the idealists by no means had it all their own way in India. The school of thought known as *Nyāya*, whose very name is often translated as ‘Epistemologists’, or ‘Logicians’ *par excellence*, was a school of critical realists of enormous influence who carried out a prolonged debate with nominalists and idealists, and anyone who might be tempted to nominalism or idealism, for over two thousand years. Since about the fourteenth century the intricate and enormously refined system of realism known as ‘*Navya-Nyāya*’, the ‘New-Nyāya’, has carried on this debate—and it still exists in India today. Not to mention the ancient tradition of ‘*Cārvāka*’, India’s very own materialists, or sometimes sceptics, and perhaps verificationists.

Part of the problem, however, for students wishing to incorporate Indian materials into their philosophical contemplations, is knowing where to start. It is not at all easy at the moment to find an introductory book written by someone with sufficient grasp of Sanskrit, mastery of the cultural context, and knowledge of contemporary philosophy. Stephen H. Phillips’s book aims to help fill that gap, and in this he is largely successful. This book is not an overview of Indian philosophy, nor is it even an overview of Indian metaphysics. In an approach with which I have great sympathy Phillips has chosen to introduce his subject by concentrating on the detailed study of some uniformly-translated passages from a few texts illustrating a particular stage in the debate between a major school of idealists known as *Advaita Vedānta*, and the defence of reasoning over an arational spiritual intuition, and realism (both in terms of universals and ‘common sense’) over idealism, in the Navya-Nyāya. In particular, Phillips has concentrated on a detailed critical attack on the very foundations of rationality and thus certainly any form of realism, by the idealist absolutist Śrīharsa (c.1150 CE), and the defence of both by followers of Navya-Nyāya such as Gaṅgeśa (early fourteenth century). In so doing many interesting philosophical topics are treated, such as truth and the justification of putative true judgements, the relationship of concept-forming to perception, the problem of universals, the status of an absence and the nature of negation, and issues relating to identity and difference. Thus the student approaches Indian philosophy through immersion directly in disputes and texts, by far the best way to get a feel for the subject. Phillips offers his own translations, in small pieces, with a careful explanation after each translation. Much of the material translated is difficult and

sophisticated, and has either not been translated before or is newly translated. Phillips also includes a romanised version of the Sanskrit text, so his translations can be checked against the original. They read well, and represent an important contribution to trying to express these texts written in a very technical form of highly-inflected philosophical Sanskrit in the rather different structures of philosophical English. Thus this book also has much to interest the specialist, as well as one new to Indian philosophy, and it is very much a book which could be used with profit by a university instructor keen to introduce the subject either to Indologists or, particularly, into a philosophy course. But Phillips does not simply throw the student in at the deep end. In earlier chapters he fills in the religious, philosophical and cultural background to Indian idealism and mysticism on the one hand, and the growth of a tradition of critical realism on the other. It is here that the book is perhaps at its weakest. Perhaps understandably, the more remote the material from Phillips's main interests the less reliable it becomes. He readily admits that he is no specialist on Buddhism (p. 330) and his portrayal of Buddhism on pp. 13–14, particularly on *nirvāna*, is very misleading. Likewise his short discussion of the early Buddhist Nāgārjuna (c. second century CE) tramples on issues which are hotly-debated among Nāgārjuna scholars. But it would be unfair to criticise Phillips for not being a specialist on every aspect of Indian philosophy. His introductory discussion of Nyāya metaphysics (pp. 37 ff.) appears excellent, and could serve as handy introduction to Nyāya for those looking for one, with some useful diagrams. Let this, and material from elsewhere, be used by instructors in their introductions. The real value of the book nevertheless lies in its detailed discussion of topics in the debate between Śrīharṣa and the Navya-Nyāya. And for that, and any boost it can give to the study of Indian philosophy among analytically-trained philosophers, the book is very welcome.

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## EPISTEMOLOGY

*Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge*

Edited by JONATHAN L. KVANIG

Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996. x + 385 pp. \$62.50 cloth, \$23.95 paper

In the early 1990s, Plantinga's *Warrant: The Current Debate* (WCD for short) surveyed current accounts of knowledge, and his companion volume *Warrant and Proper Function* (WPF) added his own theory to this debate. This theory first offered a functional definition of 'warrant' as whatever it is which distinguishes true belief from knowledge, and then added a substantive characterisation of what fills this functional role. The essentials were that a belief has warrant for you if and only if (1) the belief is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties, which (2) are operating in an environment