

REVIEWS

Meredith Williams, *Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning: Toward a Social Conception of Mind*, 1999, Routledge, xiii + 320, price £45 hb.

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I once heard a Wittgensteinian philosopher compare the philosophy of mind to a lovely, serene duck pond which had now become overwhelmed by a group of boorish swans. He was referring, of course, to the technical, yet philosophically naive, movements that have dominated the field of late. Indeed it is frequently lamented that Wittgenstein's key insights are too often ignored and misunderstood in contemporary anglophone philosophy; that his relevance to today's problems is not properly appreciated. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the burgeoning discipline that goes under the alias 'cognitive science'. At the same time, purists complain that where attempts have been made to apply Wittgenstein's insight to specialised branches of philosophy, they are taken out of context and thereby misrepresented. The charge is that one cannot understand Wittgenstein's philosophical ends and method by piecemeal borrowings from his writings. The result is standardly that good books on Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind focus on carefully explicating his views without attempting to show how they relate to the concerns of cognitive scientists. Meredith Williams' collection of essays admirably bridges this gap.

In the first half of the book, Williams usefully challenges the standard misreadings of the private language argument by emphasising that to read these sections of the *Investigations* in isolation results in a failure to see their role in a general critique of the idea that meaning might be secured by ostensive definition. It is a central theme of her essays that, in overlooking this, far too many discussions of this topic set off down the wrong path by focusing on questions like: whether a 'private rule' could be applied consistently, whether memory could serve as an adequate independent check on our use of

sign, and whether or not a special mental act of attention or picture could fix a meaning. The common problem with each of these proposals is that they presuppose precisely what Wittgenstein was primarily concerned to question, namely: that ostension or naming can occur in the absence of a presupposed standard. For example, evidence of this is found in his well-known *reductio* of the very idea of subjective justification. This is a notion which can only be made plausible by the appeal to the idea that the mental is somehow special and has capacities we do not fully understand (pp. 24–5). Thus, despite billing themselves as explanatory fixes, these strange, lifeless entities, ‘far from fixing a standard or a project, lose all purchase on normativity’ (p. 50). This is why the epitaph ‘mental’ or ‘spiritual’ must be applied to them in the hopes of making it look remotely plausible that they might be able to do the work they advertise.

I think Williams is absolutely correct in suggesting that when we look at the later passages of the *Investigations*, with one eye on the earlier sections, the target of Wittgenstein’s critique is clear and its force undeniable. She writes, ‘even with sophisticated or esoteric theories of meaning and language, the guiding idea is very simple. It is the one he describes in the opening paragraphs of the *Investigations*, “Every word has a meaning. The meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands” (PI §1)’ (p. 49).

On their own these points are hardly revelatory. Still, they are overlooked often enough that it is worth repeating them. Yet a major virtue of Williams’ book is that she goes on to show how damning these observations are to much contemporary thinking in analytical philosophy and cognitive science. For example, at one stage she sums up Wittgenstein’s views by saying, ‘In the absence of objects with mystical properties and magical acts of pure ostension, there are only human practices and ways of acting’ (p. 26). This is important because, as is well known, many contemporary philosophers fail to see that such objections apply to them. For example, they claim not to be mystery-mongers and mock those who talk of the ‘mental’ or the ‘spiritual’ in order to avoid their explanatory burdens. As good naturalists they only trade in ordinary and natural objects, events, processes and relations. But to think eschewing dualism is enough to avoid Wittgenstein’s critique is to greatly under-estimate its scope. The very problems with which he was concerned re-surface for naturalists under the titles of the misrepresentation problem and the distality problem. Both of these

are sub-species of the general problem which Williams labels the problem of 'normative regularity' (p. 51).

Yet, despite acknowledging these problems, it is still commonplace for today's thinkers to express the hope that the kind of normativity which underwrites meaning and interpretation can be explained. This is meant to be accomplished by postulating rules and relations which can be analysed wholly naturalistically – in isolation from social practices and contexts of use. The point is that, in this respect, the defenders of naturalistic theories of meaning do not differ significantly from their forerunners who hoped to understand meaning by appeal to more peculiar objects and properties which conferred meaning on lifeless signs.

For instance, this is revealed by Williams' careful step by step recounting of the problems Fodor has faced in trying to make his language of thought hypothesis credible. This is a vivid, contemporary example of the kind of philosophical error that Wittgenstein highlights when he remarks: '... If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts ...' (*Zettel*, §220, pp. 90, 95). Indeed, in outlining the retrenchments Fodor has been forced to make over the years, Williams is replaying Wittgenstein's *reductio* (p. 86).

Her hard work ought to shame those purists who denigrate attempts to show how Wittgenstein's critiques apply to contemporary philosophy. Shirking this task cannot be justified on the grounds that it is simply unnecessary for those with eyes to see. For that is not the point of the exercise. It is only by engaging in serious analyses, of the kind Williams' essays exemplify, that it is possible to open a dialogue between Wittgenstein scholars and 'main-stream' analytic philosophy. The value of this work is more than missionary, for such comparisons helps us to see more clearly the nature, value and depth of Wittgenstein's method. Specifically, it reminds us of the difference between those approaches which see philosophy as concerned with theory and those which do not. For my money, Williams' careful and clear analysis of Wittgenstein's thinking, when placed alongside a critique of certain contemporary accounts of representation, is enough to make her book worthwhile. But she does more still. In explicating Wittgenstein's reasons for rejecting any and all attempts to understand meaning by appeal to reified objects, processes or relations, she emphasises the dynamic and social character of the norms that make meaning and rule-following

possible. For example, with respect to the paradox of rule-following, she reveals that in their attempts to resolve the paradox, Kripke's appeal to the community and Baker's and Hacker's appeal to autonomous grammar both falter because they model their accounts on an individual's performance at different ends of the learning spectrum. That is to say, Kripke sees the rule-follower's lot under the aspect of the learner, whereas Baker and Hacker see it under the aspect of the master.

But Williams rightly criticises both these replies as repeating the error of trying to reify meaning in terms of some static thing – a community or grammar. In contrast, she returns to consider the positive role that ostensive teaching plays in enabling us to set standards by giving full attention to the learning situation. Here the focus is on how the novice becomes an autonomous speaker. The answer, for Wittgenstein, is by learning skilled techniques through the social medium.

The initial stages of this process do not require any propositional knowledge, hence the kind of problems that plague traditional theorists are avoided. Rather, it presupposes capacities and abilities in common between the teacher and student and that the latter is willing to blindly obey authority. Williams claims that it is by appeal to this account that Wittgenstein avoids the regress and paradox inherent in the rule-following arguments. This is so because at base rule-followers do not rest their interpretation on yet another interpretation, but on a particular kind of training which does not presuppose the intellectual capacities we hope to understand. The paradox of having multiple interpretations is also tamed by appeal to such training. For in this process, a shared sense of the obvious is developed, which rests on our shared natural reactions (pp. 222, 180). In this way we develop a communal second nature via training, as Aristotle once proposed (p. 210).

This is the social stage-setting which makes meaning possible. If we fail to understand this, then, in a misguided quest for explanation, we will be forever plagued by misleading philosophical pictures which will fail to satisfy us. Here again Williams proves herself to have a discerning ear for what Wittgenstein is really saying. It is on this basis that in the very last chapter she makes some more positive, speculative comparisons between Wittgenstein and Vygostky. But, it is in this one respect that, I think, Williams should have gone further. Although she is right to emphasise the social ground of normativity,

it strikes me that even greater emphasis ought to have been placed on the dynamic and developmental nature of our forms of life. This point is not ignored in Williams' analysis. She does note that as a result of focusing on the social character of meaning and importance of training, Wittgenstein produces 'a dynamic rather than a static account of the rule-governed practice' (p. 168). Nevertheless, the dynamic/static contrast is not given the same pride of place that the social element occupies – as the very title of the book suggests. But there are reasons for thinking that it might have had more prominence. For example, in the chapter entitled 'The Metaphysics of Experience', she compares and contrasts the philosophical approaches of Kant and Wittgenstein and asks whether, and in what sense, the latter ought to be thought of as a transcendental philosopher. The similarities are clear. Both are concerned with issues of sense and nonsense in a way that makes it look as if Wittgenstein's grammar might be a substitute for Kantian synthetic a priori categories. But Williams rightly emphasises that the key difference between them is found in Wittgenstein's rejection of Kantian categories if these are seen as defining a fixed, universal and positive limit to the bounds of sense. It is not just that he sees our categories as located in language as opposed to the 'mind', but more crucially that this placement matters to what we think drives and determines conceptual change and the boundaries of sense. Playing Aristotle to Kant's Plato, Wittgenstein 'inverts the Kantian order of priority' (pp. 76, 177). Concepts get their lives from our practices, not vice versa. Since these practices develop and evolve, there can be no transcendental setting of limits to sense in advance or once and for all. Thus, when engaged in philosophy, we must not theorise from the general to the particular, but describe and be vigilant of transgressions of sense. On this reading one can see a crucial change in Wittgenstein's thinking from the time of the *Tractatus* to the later works. For whereas the governor of all sense in the *Tractatus* was a static, unchanging and unsayable logical structure of the world and thought, what we have in the later writing is our dynamic, changing, shared forms of life. We cannot explicate their nature via theory any more than we could talk about logic, but because the process of training, by which we come to see what is obvious, is understood by us, there is no reason for philosophy to end in mysticism.

For this reason I think that the issue of the dynamic and developmental nature of our use of concepts ought to be given even

greater emphasis than Williams gives it. At least, it should be on an equal footing with the social dimension. In all, despite this quibble about emphasis, this is a remarkably clear and immensely rewarding book.

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John Cottingham, *Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian and Psychoanalytic Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, xiii + 230, price £37.50 hb/£13.95 pb.

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Cottingham's book has an ambitious title, and it successfully lives up to it. He contrasts the traditional aims of what he calls the 'synoptic' conception of philosophy, to provide a comprehensive system of thought which will enable human beings to live good and fulfilling lives, with the much more modest aspirations of contemporary philosophy as an academic discipline. This narrowing of horizons is explained partly by intellectual changes, in particular the abandonment of a teleological world-view in which the good human life reflects the purposes built into the natural universe, but also by institutional changes such as the professionalisation of philosophy and the fragmented structure of the modern university. Cottingham perhaps takes insufficient account of the influence of liberal pluralism. There may be good reasons for philosophers to shrink from offering prescriptions for 'the good life', not because of any view about the limits of philosophy, but on the grounds that *no one* is in a position to tell others what sort of life to live, since there is no one version of 'the good life'. As Cottingham notes, the 'enormous resurgence of interest in normative ethics' (p. 18) is evidence of a willingness to tackle difficult and important practical issues, and the focusing of this philosophical work on matters of public policy rather than personal

fulfilment may have deeper roots than an excessive professional modesty. Be that as it may, one does not have to accept simplistic assumptions about a single simple recipe for the good life to recognise the legitimacy of Cottingham's more specific theme: the respective roles of reason and the passions in a flourishing human life. He offers not only a historical discussion of past philosophers' contributions to this theme but also his own rich and perceptive account of the topic, thereby exemplifying the conception of philosophy as a form of intellectual enquiry which can illuminate and guide our lives.

Cottingham's discussion is organised in the form of a historical narrative in three stages. The first is constituted by the various ancient Greek versions of the synoptic conception of philosophy, all of which present the life of reason as the culminating practical conclusion of an integrated philosophical system. He refers to this common ethical ground which the Greek philosophers share as 'ratiocentric ethics'. As he says, this philosophical affirmation of the importance of reason is all the more striking when seen against the background of a culture, exemplified by Homer and the tragedians, which is deeply conscious of the irrational force of the passions in human life – what Nietzsche was later to identify as the Dionysian strand in ancient Greek culture. Cottingham recognises that there are important contrasts and divisions within the philosophers' ratiocentric ethics, and to mark these he introduces a helpful classification employing the labels 'rational exclusivism', 'rational hegemonism', and 'rational instrumentalism'. He sees the Greek tradition as dominated by the first two positions, with a strong strand of rational exclusivism running through it. Plato is presented as the paradigmatic exclusivist, treating the passions as a threat to the good life and advocating an ethical intellectualism. Cottingham regards it as a matter for debate whether the Stoics and Epicureans should be classified as rational exclusivists, but at any rate both philosophies aim to eliminate a whole range of central human emotions from the good life. Aristotle is less obviously a rational exclusivist. Though he ends the *Nicomachean Ethics* by endorsing the Platonic ideal of the philosophical life as the supremely good life, his ethics as a whole embraces the range of human passions within a conception of the good life as 'the harmonious flourishing of all our human capacities' (p. 40). Cottingham is inclined to classify Aristotle's ethics as a version of 'rational hegemonism' (p. 43), but he nevertheless sees it as still damagingly tied to the influence of Platonic intellectualism, and he

finds this especially in Aristotle's account of *akrasia*. As he says, Aristotle remains wedded in the end to an interpretation of *akrasia* as a cognitive failure. Cottingham finds an important truth in this, which he will illuminate further in the third stage of the historical narrative, but in Aristotle's hands this insight remains undeveloped because Aristotle lacks an adequate philosophy of mind and, in particular, the modern concept of unconscious mental processes, and remains tied to a Platonic intellectualism.

The other division which Cottingham recognises within Greek ratiocentric ethics is between the teleological conception, exemplified by Stoicism, in which the good human life is one lived in harmony with the purposes built into the natural world, and the Epicurean picture of a purposeless mechanistic universe in which human beings can nevertheless live happy and tranquil lives when their reason has freed them from the chains of illusion. Epicureanism prefigures the second stage of Cottingham's historical narrative, the version of synoptic philosophy which accompanies the emergence of the scientific world-view in the seventeenth century. Despite the abandonment of cosmic teleology, the seventeenth century philosophers do not abandon the ambitious conception of philosophy as a systematic understanding of the universe, whose fruits are a practical ethics and a view of the good life. Cottingham focuses especially on Descartes and draws on his own specialist work as a Descartes scholar to illuminate this stage of the historical narrative. He provides a corrective to the picture of Descartes, encouraged by academic philosophy syllabuses, as primarily an epistemologist. Descartes remains wedded to the synoptic conception of philosophy as a complete system with practical implications. One aspect of this practical outcome is a picture of human beings as radically set apart from nature but able to control it and master it through a knowledge of its causes and effects. But Cottingham also emphasises that Descartes, though not normally regarded as a moral philosopher, was especially in his later years concerned with ethics and psychology and has a distinctive contribution to make to the account of the role of reason and the passions in the good life. Cottingham reads Descartes not as a simple dualist but rather as a 'trialist', for whom an adequate anthropology requires the recognition of a third category of states, including appetites and emotions and sensations, which arise from the distinctive union of mind and body. In *The Passions of the Soul* Descartes sees the passions as crucial for the ethical quality of human

lives. In contrast to a Platonic intellectualism, he sees the passions as essentially good, but the Cartesian ethics rests also on a proper understanding of the operation of the passions. This involves recognising that the passions are not under our direct conscious control, since they are the product of physiological processes which are necessarily opaque to us. Nevertheless, by reflecting on our patterns of psycho-physical response, we can learn to manipulate our passions so that we are no longer in thrall to them.

The important breakthrough here, Cottingham suggests, is Descartes' recognition of the opacity of the origins of the passions – ironically so in view of the popular picture of Descartes as the advocate of a naive 'transparency' account of mental states. Cottingham sees this breakthrough as taken further in the third stage of his historical narrative – the modern recognition of the importance of unconscious motivations. Drawing on the common ground of psychoanalytical theory rather than on any specific school, he first defends the idea of 'unconscious mental processes' against certain philosophical criticisms, and then proceeds to argue for the important contribution which psychoanalytical theory can make to the traditional discussion of the role of reason and the passions in the good life. Particularly telling is his use of an extended imaginary example to illustrate the rich resources of psychoanalysis in filling out our understanding of *akrasia*, and of the method of 'transformational analysis' in enabling us to achieve self-knowledge and to integrate the passions into a harmonious and fulfilling human life.

Cottingham certainly seems to me to make a wholly persuasive case for the value of locating psychoanalytical ideas within the philosophical tradition of thought about reason and the good life. His linking of them is immensely illuminating in both directions. I am left uncertain about how much continuity or discontinuity he finds in the history which he traces. How much of a radical breakthrough does he think that psychoanalysis represents? As he acknowledges (p. 162), there is a case for seeing the psychoanalytic approach as a continuation of the ratiocentric tradition; bringing unconscious motives and desires into consciousness enables us to exercise rational control over them, and thereby to advance more effectively the claims of reason envisaged by the ancients and by Descartes. He is inclined, however, to formulate the lessons of psychoanalysis in terms of a more humble role for reason. Full self-awareness, he says, 'requires a new *kind* of understanding, one mediated not by the grasp

of the controlling intellect, but by a responsiveness to the rhythms of the whole self' (p. 163). We need to recognise, he thinks, that the deepest sources of human emotion and imagination are 'beyond reason's power wholly to encompass and regulate' (p. 164).

Elsewhere he makes what seem to me to be even stronger claims about the discontinuity between pre- and post-Freudian ethics. Commenting on the failure of contemporary philosophical ethics to learn from psychoanalysis, he points out that most modern moral philosophers work within the traditions emanating either from Aristotle, from Kant, or from Bentham, and each of these he sees as compromised by the limitations of ethical intellectualism. I am not convinced, however, that his comments on the weaknesses of these ethical theories appeal to deep rather than relatively superficial features of them. He can, for instance, easily remind us of the naive rationalistic optimism of Bentham the reformer, with his crude felicific calculus and his simplistic assumptions about how the desires of individuals can be manipulated to promote the greatest happiness, but I doubt whether any modern utilitarians would regard themselves as committed to any of these Benthamite assumptions. More seriously, perhaps, the deliverances of the Kantian conscience are called in question by the psychoanalytic account of the super-ego, and this makes it more difficult for latter-day Kantians to maintain the same uncritical confidence in the claims of moral reason; but as Cottingham partly acknowledges, there is a great deal in contemporary Kantian ethics which remains unaffected by this criticism. Most interesting is the case of Aristotle. As we have already seen, Aristotle is the Greek philosopher least tainted with the charge of ethical intellectualism. Despite his advocacy of the contemplative life in Book X of the *Ethics*, he recognises that such a life is 'more divine than human', and his main account of the fulfilled human life is of a life in which reason and the passions are in harmonious balance. Cottingham does justice to all of this, but in the later passage criticising Aristotle along with Kant and Bentham, he applies a more demanding standard. Aristotle, he says, accepts that *eudaimonia* will always be fragile and vulnerable to the blows of fortune. 'But the post-Freudian worry is altogether more pervasive and disturbing. It is that the area of "fortune" – the recalcitrant residue over which rational choice has no control – extends inwards to the very core of our being' (p. 134). In contradiction to Aristotle, then, psychoanalytic theory is apparently taken to imply that 'the very

notion of rational deliberation as a guide to action seems shaky' (p. 135). At this point my uncertainty about how much continuity or discontinuity Cottingham sees between the ratiocentric tradition and psychoanalytic ethics again merges with another uncertainty, about what exactly he wants to claim for psychoanalysis. Does he think that by becoming aware of our unconscious motivations we can exert more rational control over our lives? Or does he want to draw the more pessimistic conclusion that such control is always bound to be beyond our grasp?

His ambiguity on this point is most apparent in certain passages where he suggests that the problem is not just the unconscious status of many of our mental processes. There is also what he sees as the problem of *retrospective reinterpretation*, which he introduces by way of Bernard Williams' thoughts on 'the Gauguin problem' (pp. 48–50) and subsequently restates in a more thoroughgoing way in terms of Lacan's deliberations on the Freudian concept of *Nachträglichkeit* (pp. 134–5). On this view, the character of our acts and experiences is determined retrospectively, when they come to be reconstructed in the light of our subsequent desires. Cottingham quotes Lacan as follows:

In psychoanalysis by our use of language we reorder past contingencies by conferring on them the necessities to come . . . At each turning point, the subject restructures himself, and each restructuring takes place, as Freud puts it, *nachträglich* [retrospectively and retroactively].

As Cottingham comments, this 'radically undermines the linear, unidirectional account which is presupposed in Aristotle's conception of deliberative rationality' (p. 135). Unfortunately it also seems to undermine the very possibility of deliberative rationality altogether. The obstacle to rational control of our lives here appears to be not just psychological, but logical. If the very identity of our psychological states is radically underdetermined, at the mercy of future events, then the resources of reason seem bound to be defeated, and no amount of psychoanalytic understanding or transformational analysis can help us.

I have referred to 'ambiguities' in Cottingham's account, but I suspect that they are more properly described as uncertainties in the subject-matter itself, to which Cottingham is sensitive and to which he alerts us. They are themselves testimony to the importance of the

psychoanalytic ideas and their relevance to the philosophical tradition. In exploring them so effectively, Cottingham has provided an immensely impressive example of the kind of philosophical work which he thinks we need to revive. The book is beautifully written, combining a practical urgency with meticulous scholarship. The extensive endnotes provide enough references and evidence to satisfy the most demanding of academic judges. It is at the same time, in the true spirit of synoptic philosophy, a book which can illuminate and enrich our lives.

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Frank Cioffi, *Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience*, 1998, Open Court, xi + 313, price £17.50 pb.

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Frank Cioffi, in his book *Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience*, asks the question, 'Why are we still arguing about Freud?' He answers this question in part by documenting how Freudian apologists, revisionists and critics have mapped out the disputed territory. Adolf Grunbaum, a critic, has argued for the falsifiability of psychoanalytic explanations against Karl Popper's argument for the unfalsifiability of psychoanalytic explanations. Cioffi, however, points out that Grunbaum may have misunderstood Popper's notion of untestability, namely, that it is not a necessary condition of a theory being pseudoscientific that it be untestable. J. O. Wisdom, in a similar vein to Grunbaum, argues for the falsifiability of psychoanalytic explanations by invoking the notion of memory lapse. In other words, if a patient cannot remember having experienced infantile molestation, then there is no way of connecting those events in infancy to certain forms of neuroses such as hysteria. Hence, on that view, the theory that hysteria is caused by infantile molestation can be falsified. However, Wisdom thinks that the memory lapse is explainable in Freudian terms, and by this I take him to mean that

one can make an association between infantile molestation and hysteria without that association being instantiated empirically. Cioffi argues that Wisdom has confused potential non-instantiation with potential falsification. In other words, it may be that in one instant a particular person cannot recall certain events. However, one cannot conclude from that instance of non-instantiation, that thereby all instances will be falsified and hence that Freudian explanations are falsifiable.

Cioffi argues that the untestability of a theory does not have to render it pseudoscientific anymore than the testability of a theory has to show that it is by definition scientific. For example, we can imagine scientists such as physicists postulating empirical unobservables and yet not being thought of as pseudoscientists. Similarly, we can think of theorists providing, for example, evidence to show that consumer shopping habits are directly correlated with advertising, and yet not think of these theorists as scientists. Cioffi puts all this in terms of how our expectations can be either underdetermined or misleading. The first case of underdetermined expectation relates to a theory that one could imagine being testable, but where not all the evidence was as yet available. The second case of misleading expectation relates to a theory where the evidence appeared to be available, but was on further inspection only masquerading as evidence.

Cioffi is concerned to make clear the distinction between confirmation and instantiation. One can think of theories where what looked like some form of evidence could be provided in the form of an instance or exemplification, but which could not be confirmed because failed on testing. Cioffi gives an example of how lack of carnal gratification looks like confirmation or evidence for sexual frustration, but really is an instantiation of sexual frustration. In other words, if we extend the term sexual to include Plato's Eros and the Christian notion of love, we arrive at something that is more than purely carnal gratification. Therefore, lack of carnal gratification is an instantiation of sexual frustration, but lack of carnal gratification is not the sole confirmatory evidence for being sexually frustrated.

One of the most interesting points that Cioffi discusses in relation to Wittgenstein's views on Freud is the peculiar juxtaposition of his theory and practice. On the one hand, Freud wants to make the claim that the explanatory causes of one's behaviour are unconscious, and yet on the other wants to make the apparently contradictory claim

that the therapeutic efficacy of those explanations are dependent on the avowal of the patient. This is what has been famously referred to as Freud's abominable mess. The mess occurs because Freud conflates reasons with causes. Cioffi goes on to compare psychoanalytic explanations with aesthetic explanations. He argues that neither are concerned with mechanistic causal explanations, for those kinds of explanations cannot resolve problems about why, for example, in the aesthetic case, we get a particular impression from a painting, or why we accept particular psychoanalytic reasons for our behaviour. This would not discount, as Cioffi says, giving scientific accounts of the causes of, for example, the olfactory nerve whilst smelling a rose, but that cannot be the full story about why we find the rose pleasurable. For the associations made in those cases are not causal associations but conceptual comparisons. In the psychoanalytic case they are not causal associations between unconscious thoughts and events, but are expressive ways of using the language to get people to see the point being made by the comparison.

Cioffi discusses the epistemological relation between wishes and the phenomena they cause. He examines what he sees as the mistaken view of thinkers such as Richard Peters, who argue that wishes are like material processes that cause other processes to happen rather than being explanatory reasons for wanting one thing or another. Cioffi defends Freud from this same accusation and argues that Freud identifies the rationalisation involved in wishing. Cases of hysteria, forgetfulness and other phobias are thought to be instrumental in wishing for a certain end. Cioffi raises the question as to whether we can know in all cases if the perceived symptoms are intentional in the way just described, for there may be contradictory intentions. How can we know that a particular wish is being gratified or fulfilled on the evidence of a particular symptom? Why should Dora's cough be the reason for her disguised love for Herr K and not, for example, her limp? The rejoinder to this is to argue that, on the Freudian account, what is not intended to be intentional is also intentional.

Cioffi, like Popper, wants to say that psychoanalysis is unfalsifiable, but unlike Popper wants to say that psychoanalysis is not pseudoscientific because of its unfalsifiability. Cioffi's point is that psychoanalytic claims can be refuted by non-empirical means. One then wants to ask, where does unfalsifiability fit into psychoanalysis if psychoanalysis can be a pseudoscience that is falsifiable? Cioffi would want to argue in defence that the demarcation between science as

falsifiable and pseudoscience as unfalsifiable is inadequate because what one takes as falsifying evidence is ambiguous. Hence, something not being falsifiable would not necessarily render it pseudoscientific. However, Cioffi takes a reading of Popper to suggest that there may be falsifiable theories that are pseudoscientific. Cioffi wants to agree with Popper and distinguish between those theories that are instantiated but not falsifiable and those theories that are instantiated and falsifiable. But how does that tell us which theories are pseudoscientific? In the end, Cioffi wants to broaden the notion of what can be included in what it means for something to be a science and for something to be a pseudoscience because cases will differ. However, the question still remains as to why the notion of pseudoscience is needed. Cioffi certainly wants to retain that notion. He wants to retain that notion because although certain psychoanalytic claims operate with some of the same categories as normal scientific explanations, their hypotheses are not instantiated nor falsified on empirical grounds, but only give the appearance of being so. This latter point does not seem to square with Cioffi's view that is pervasive throughout the book, namely, that Freud's grounds for the existence of infantile molestation of his patients were invalid, such invalidity resting on empirical grounds. I think that it is the notion of trying to define pseudoscience as distinct from science, whilst at the same time buying into scientific and non-scientific categories alike, that results in contradictions. The contradictions can be seen to emerge for two main reasons. First, there is the moral concern to make sure that events in the patient's past are not simply made up to corroborate with particular theories, hence the empirical need. Second, there is the concern that psychoanalytic explanations are explanations to which patients give assent and hence are related to what a patient can come to see as rationally justifiable. It seems that Cioffi quite naturally falls between these two.

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