Abstract
This paper works on the assumption that much of On Certainty is devoted to fleshing out the distinction between certainty and knowledge. Our basic certainties – or 'hinge certainties', or 'hinges' – make up our world picture and underpin knowledge, not being themselves, however, of an epistemic nature. Wittgenstein's deliberations in On Certainty show him to realize that our basic certainties share the following conceptual features; they are all: nonepistemic, indubitable, nonempirical, grammatical, nonpropositional, ineffable, enacted and foundational. The necessary features of hinges are discussed at some length in the paper.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 3-30 |
Number of pages | 28 |
Journal | Dissertatio: Revista de Filosofia |
Volume | 1 |
Issue number | Special issue |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2015 |
Keywords
- Wittgenstein
- certainty
- epistemology
- hinges
- basic beliefs