AFGHANISTAN'S 2004 CONSTITUTION IN THUCYDIDES'S TRAP: A MISSED CHANCE FOR STABILITY

This study examines why Afghanistan’s 2004 Constitution, despite its democratic aspirations, failed to produce political stability. It argues that the process and outcome of constitution-making reproduced long-standing hegemonic hierarchies rather than transforming them. Drawing on Graham Allison’s concept of Thucydides’s Trap, the article adapts the logic of hegemonic transition to the domestic sphere, interpreting Afghanistan’s post-2001 political settlement as an intra-state contest between established and rising groups. Empirically, the analysis is based on twenty semi-structured interviews—ten with political elites and ten with citizens—conducted in June and July 2025, complemented by a historical examination of Afghanistan’s ethno-political landscape. The findings show that the constitution-making process became a continuation of civil war by other means: rather than creating a broad-based political structure, it reconstituted old hierarchies through a highly centralised presidency that reflected the dominance of one group. The resulting framework institutionalised zero-sum competition and reinforced perceptions of exclusion, undermining the prospects for durable stability. The study contributes to debates on constitution-making in deeply divided societies by extending the logic of Thucydides’s Trap from the international to the domestic sphere, illustrating how hegemonic fears can derail democratic transitions and perpetuate cycles of instability.