Apparent actions and apparent goal-directedness

D. Polani; Martin Biehl

doi:10.7551/978-0-262-33027-5-ch089

Apparent actions and apparent goal-directedness

D. Polani, Martin Biehl

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

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Abstract

In human history countless phenomena have
been (wrongly) attributed to agents. For instance, now science
believes there are no gods (agents) of lightning, thunder
and wind behind the associated phenomena.
In physics (assuming quantum decoherence) the universe
is modelled as a state space with a dynamical law that determines
everything that happens within it. This however, is
incompatible with most notions of agency (cf. Barandiaran
et al., 2009) which require actions: For an agent candidate
to have actions it must be able to “make something happen”
as opposed to only “have things happen to it”.
Here we ask which single sequences of partial observations
may appear to contain agency to a passive observer
who has its own memory. For this we define measures
of apparent actions and apparent goal-directedness.
Goal-directedness is another feature commonly attributed to
agents. We here ignore whatever causes the appearances and
the concept of individuality of agents.

Original language	English
Pages	511
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.7551/978-0-262-33027-5-ch089
Publication status	Published - Jul 2015
Event	13th European Conf on Artificial Life (ECAL 2015) - York, United Kingdom Duration: 20 Jul 2015 → 24 Jul 2015

Conference

Conference	13th European Conf on Artificial Life (ECAL 2015)
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	York
Period	20/07/15 → 24/07/15

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Cite this

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title = "Apparent actions and apparent goal-directedness",

abstract = "In human history countless phenomena havebeen (wrongly) attributed to agents. For instance, now sciencebelieves there are no gods (agents) of lightning, thunderand wind behind the associated phenomena.In physics (assuming quantum decoherence) the universeis modelled as a state space with a dynamical law that determineseverything that happens within it. This however, isincompatible with most notions of agency (cf. Barandiaranet al., 2009) which require actions: For an agent candidateto have actions it must be able to “make something happen”as opposed to only “have things happen to it”.Here we ask which single sequences of partial observationsmay appear to contain agency to a passive observerwho has its own memory. For this we define measuresof apparent actions and apparent goal-directedness.Goal-directedness is another feature commonly attributed toagents. We here ignore whatever causes the appearances andthe concept of individuality of agents.",

author = "D. Polani and Martin Biehl",

note = "Daniel Polani, Martin Biehl, {\textquoteleft}Apparent actions and apparent goal-directedness{\textquoteright}, paper presented at the 13th European Conference on Artificial Life (ECAL 2015), York, UK, 20-24 July, 2015. ; 13th European Conf on Artificial Life (ECAL 2015) ; Conference date: 20-07-2015 Through 24-07-2015",

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AU - Biehl, Martin

N1 - Daniel Polani, Martin Biehl, ‘Apparent actions and apparent goal-directedness’, paper presented at the 13th European Conference on Artificial Life (ECAL 2015), York, UK, 20-24 July, 2015.

PY - 2015/7

Y1 - 2015/7

N2 - In human history countless phenomena havebeen (wrongly) attributed to agents. For instance, now sciencebelieves there are no gods (agents) of lightning, thunderand wind behind the associated phenomena.In physics (assuming quantum decoherence) the universeis modelled as a state space with a dynamical law that determineseverything that happens within it. This however, isincompatible with most notions of agency (cf. Barandiaranet al., 2009) which require actions: For an agent candidateto have actions it must be able to “make something happen”as opposed to only “have things happen to it”.Here we ask which single sequences of partial observationsmay appear to contain agency to a passive observerwho has its own memory. For this we define measuresof apparent actions and apparent goal-directedness.Goal-directedness is another feature commonly attributed toagents. We here ignore whatever causes the appearances andthe concept of individuality of agents.

AB - In human history countless phenomena havebeen (wrongly) attributed to agents. For instance, now sciencebelieves there are no gods (agents) of lightning, thunderand wind behind the associated phenomena.In physics (assuming quantum decoherence) the universeis modelled as a state space with a dynamical law that determineseverything that happens within it. This however, isincompatible with most notions of agency (cf. Barandiaranet al., 2009) which require actions: For an agent candidateto have actions it must be able to “make something happen”as opposed to only “have things happen to it”.Here we ask which single sequences of partial observationsmay appear to contain agency to a passive observerwho has its own memory. For this we define measuresof apparent actions and apparent goal-directedness.Goal-directedness is another feature commonly attributed toagents. We here ignore whatever causes the appearances andthe concept of individuality of agents.

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DO - 10.7551/978-0-262-33027-5-ch089

M3 - Paper

SP - 511

T2 - 13th European Conf on Artificial Life (ECAL 2015)

Y2 - 20 July 2015 through 24 July 2015

ER -

Apparent actions and apparent goal-directedness

Abstract

Conference

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