Abstract
In 'Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism', Peter Hacker addresses what he takes to be misconceptions of Wittgenstein's philosophy with respect to 1) the periodisation of his thought and to what should properly be counted as part of his work; 2) his conception of grammar since the Big Typescript (1929-1933); 3) his conception of philosophy as grammatical investigation. I argue that Hacker's restrictive conception of what ought to be considered part of Wittgenstein's philosophy and his conservative view of Wittgensteinian grammar are unjustified and prevent him from appreciating the revolutionary importance of On Certainty for epistemology. Finally, while agreeing that Wittgenstein views philosophy as grammatical elucidation, I suggest some reasons for the resistance this view has generated.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 355-80 |
Journal | Philosophical Investigations |
Volume | 36 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 31 May 2013 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2013 |
Keywords
- Wittgenstein, Hacker, On Certainty, grammar, third Wittgenstein