Abstract
When Wittgenstein is called a pragmatist, it is usually with qualification. In this paper, I examine some of the criteria used to rally Wittgenstein to pragmatism (primacy of action, anti-foundationalism, fallibilism), and conclude that inasmuch as Wittgenstein is neither an anti-foundationalist nor a fallibilist, there may not be sufficient grounds to call him a pragmatist. But nothing stands in the way of considering him a full-fledged enactivist.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 67-85 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Paradigmi |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 17 Jan 2017 |
Keywords
- Wittgenstein
- Pragmatism
- Enactivism
- Fallibilism
- Foundationalism
- Basic Beliefs
- action