Effects of Neighbourhood Structure on Evolution of Cooperation in N-Player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Raymond Chiong, Sandeep Dhakal, Lubo Jankovic

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In multi-agent systems, complex and dynamic interactions often emerge among individual agents. The ability of each agent to learn adaptively is therefore important for them to survive in such changing environment. In this paper, we consider the effects of neighbourhood structure on the evolution of cooperative behaviour in the N-Player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (NIPD). We simulate the NIPD as a bidding game on a two dimensional grid-world, where each agent has to bid against its neighbours based on a chosen game strategy. We conduct experiments with three different types of neighbourhood structures, namely the triangular neighbourhood structure, the rectangular neighbourhood structure and the random pairing structure. Our results show that cooperation does emerge under the triangular neighbourhood structure, but defection prevails under the rectangular neighbourhood structure as well as the random pairing structure.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIntelligent Data Engineering and Automated Learning - IDEAL 2007
Place of PublicationBerlin, Heidelberg
PublisherSpringer Nature Link
Pages950-959
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-540-77226-2
ISBN (Print)978-3-540-77225-5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007
EventInternational Conference on Intelligent Data Engineering and Automated Learning, 2007 - Birmingham, United Kingdom
Duration: 16 Dec 200719 Dec 2007

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
VolumeLNCS, volume 4881

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference on Intelligent Data Engineering and Automated Learning, 2007
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityBirmingham
Period16/12/0719/12/07

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