Abstract
A number of theorists have proposed simulation theories of empathy. A review these theories show that, despite the fact that one version of the simulation theory can avoid a number of problems associated with such approaches, there are further reasons to doubt whether simulation actually explains empathy. A high-level simulation account of empathy, distinguished from the simulation theory of mindreading, can avoid problems associated with low-level (neural) simulationist accounts; but it fails to adequately address two problems: the diversity problem and the starting problem. It is then argued that a narrative approach to empathy avoids all of these problems and offers a more parsimonious account.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 355-381 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Science in Context |
Volume | 25 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sept 2012 |
Keywords
- empathy
- narrative
- simulation