TY - JOUR
T1 - How to Insult and Compliment a Testifier
AU - Malcolm, Finlay
N1 - This article has been published in a revised form in Episteme,
https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.39.
This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © 2016 Cambridge University Press.
PY - 2018/3/1
Y1 - 2018/3/1
N2 - Do we insult or slight a speaker when we reject her testimony? Do we compliment or commend her when we accept her testimony? This paper argues that the answer to both of these questions is yes, but only in some instances, since these respective insults and compliments track the reasons a hearer has for rejecting or accepting testimony. When disbelieving a speaker, a hearer may insult her because she judges the speaker to be either incompetent as a knower or insincere as a teller. By outlining the predominant reasons we have for rejecting testimony, I show how not every instance of rejecting testimony embodies this negative evaluation of the speaker. By contrast, testimonial compliments are fewer in number, and are not constitutive of everyday testimonial exchanges, since speakers who are competent as knowers and sincere as tellers are merely behaving correctly in accordance with the norms of testifying. Nevertheless, deferring to an authority on belief can be complimentary to that speaker if by doing so we judge her to have some mastery in a particular domain. This suggests an asymmetry between rejecting and accepting testimony. Testimonial insults and compliments also have important moral applications, particularly regarding epistemic injustice and therapeutic trust.
AB - Do we insult or slight a speaker when we reject her testimony? Do we compliment or commend her when we accept her testimony? This paper argues that the answer to both of these questions is yes, but only in some instances, since these respective insults and compliments track the reasons a hearer has for rejecting or accepting testimony. When disbelieving a speaker, a hearer may insult her because she judges the speaker to be either incompetent as a knower or insincere as a teller. By outlining the predominant reasons we have for rejecting testimony, I show how not every instance of rejecting testimony embodies this negative evaluation of the speaker. By contrast, testimonial compliments are fewer in number, and are not constitutive of everyday testimonial exchanges, since speakers who are competent as knowers and sincere as tellers are merely behaving correctly in accordance with the norms of testifying. Nevertheless, deferring to an authority on belief can be complimentary to that speaker if by doing so we judge her to have some mastery in a particular domain. This suggests an asymmetry between rejecting and accepting testimony. Testimonial insults and compliments also have important moral applications, particularly regarding epistemic injustice and therapeutic trust.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84995393618&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/epi.2016.39
DO - 10.1017/epi.2016.39
M3 - Article
SN - 1742-3600
VL - 15
SP - 50
EP - 64
JO - Episteme
JF - Episteme
IS - 1
ER -