Introducing disappointment dynamics and comparing behaviors in evolutionary games: Some simulation results

Tassos Patokos

doi:10.3390/g5010001

Introducing disappointment dynamics and comparing behaviors in evolutionary games: Some simulation results

Tassos Patokos

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Abstract

The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type: spontaneous agents, rigid players, and 'satisficers'. We use simulations to examine the performance of these types. Agents who change their strategies relatively easily tend to perform better in coordination games, but antagonistic games generally lead to more favorable outcomes if the individuals only change their strategies when disappointment from previous rounds surpasses some predefined threshold.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-25
Number of pages	25
Journal	Games
Volume	5
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3390/g5010001
Publication status	Published - 30 Jan 2014

Keywords

Adaptive procedure
Disappointment
Game theory
Reinforcement learning
Revision protocol
Simulations

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10.3390/g5010001Licence: CC BY

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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited
Final published version, 503 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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N2 - The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type: spontaneous agents, rigid players, and 'satisficers'. We use simulations to examine the performance of these types. Agents who change their strategies relatively easily tend to perform better in coordination games, but antagonistic games generally lead to more favorable outcomes if the individuals only change their strategies when disappointment from previous rounds surpasses some predefined threshold.

AB - The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type: spontaneous agents, rigid players, and 'satisficers'. We use simulations to examine the performance of these types. Agents who change their strategies relatively easily tend to perform better in coordination games, but antagonistic games generally lead to more favorable outcomes if the individuals only change their strategies when disappointment from previous rounds surpasses some predefined threshold.

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Introducing disappointment dynamics and comparing behaviors in evolutionary games: Some simulation results

Abstract

Keywords

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