Kant and Hegel on Purposive Action

Constantine Sandis, Erasmus Mayr, Arto Laitinen

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    30 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    This essay discusses Kant and Hegel’s philosophies of action and the place of action within the general structure of their practical philosophy. We begin by briefly noting a few things that both unite and distinguish the two philosophers. In the sections that follow, we consider these and their corollaries in more detail. In so doing, we map their differences against those suggested by more standard readings that treat their accounts of action as less central to their practical philosophy. Section 2 discusses some central Kantian concepts (Freedom, Willkür, Wille, and Moral Law). In Section 3, we take a closer look at the distinction between internal and external action, as found in Kant’s philosophy of morality and legality. In Section 4, we turn to Hegel and his distinctions between abstract right (legality), morality, and ethical life, as well as the location of his account of action within his overall theory of morality. We discuss the distinction between Handlung and Tat, and non-imputable consequences. The overall aims of our essay are to shed light on some puzzles in Kant and Hegel’s conceptions and to examine where their exact disputes lie without taking a stand on which philosophy is ultimately the most satisfactory.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)90-107
    Number of pages18
    JournalPhilosophical Explorations
    Volume21
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 16 Jan 2018

    Keywords

    • Handlung
    • Hegel
    • Kant
    • Tat
    • Wille
    • Willkür
    • action
    • ethics
    • freedom
    • moral law
    • will

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Kant and Hegel on Purposive Action'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this