Large Shareholding and Firm Value in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)

Mona Mortazian, Asieh Tabaghdehi (Editor), Bryan Mase (Advisor)

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review


This paper investigates the impact of non-managerial and managerial blockholders
on the value of the firms listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). This study mainly investigates whether the effect of blockholders on firm value is due to the AIM high ownership concentration and low investor protection. The primary empirical finding, using GMM, justifies that non-managerial and managerial blockholders in the AIM affect the firm value in different ways. Non-managerial blockholders in the AIM improve the firm value by monitoring managers when their block sizes are up to 32 per cent. However, when their block sizes exceed 32 per cent, the blockholders expropriate other shareholders.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages252
Publication statusPublished - 2019


  • Corporate governance, Alternative Investment Market (AIM), Managerial blockholders, Firm value, Tobin's Q, Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)


Dive into the research topics of 'Large Shareholding and Firm Value in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this