TY - JOUR
T1 - Logical fallacies as informational shortcuts
AU - Floridi, L.
N1 - “The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com”. Copyright Springer DOI: 10.1007/s11229-008-9410-y
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - The paper argues that the two best known formal logical fallacies, namely denying the antecedent (DA) and affirming the consequent (AC) are not just basic and simple errors, which prove human irrationality, but rather informational shortcuts, which may provide a quick and dirty way of extracting useful information from the environment. DA and AC are shown to be degraded versions of Bayes’ theorem, once this is stripped of some of its probabilities. The less the probabilities count, the closer these fallacies become to a reasoning that is not only informationally useful but also logically valid.
AB - The paper argues that the two best known formal logical fallacies, namely denying the antecedent (DA) and affirming the consequent (AC) are not just basic and simple errors, which prove human irrationality, but rather informational shortcuts, which may provide a quick and dirty way of extracting useful information from the environment. DA and AC are shown to be degraded versions of Bayes’ theorem, once this is stripped of some of its probabilities. The less the probabilities count, the closer these fallacies become to a reasoning that is not only informationally useful but also logically valid.
U2 - 10.1007/s11229-008-9410-y
DO - 10.1007/s11229-008-9410-y
M3 - Article
SN - 0039-7857
VL - 167
SP - 317
EP - 325
JO - Synthese
JF - Synthese
IS - 2
ER -