Abstract
Panpsychism, an increasingly popular competitor to physicalism as a theory of mind, faces a famous difficulty, the ‘combination problem’. This is the difficulty of understanding the composition of a conscious mind by parts (the ultimates) which are themselves taken to be phenomenally qualitied. I examine the combination problem, and I attempt to solve it. There are a few distinct difficulties under the banner of ‘the combination problem’, and not all of them need worry panpsychists. After homing in on the genuine worries, I identify some disputable assumptions that underlie them. Doing away with these assumptions allows us to make a start on a working conception of phenomenal combination.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 137-166 |
Journal | Dialectica |
Volume | 66 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2012 |
Keywords
- panpsychism, consciousness, combination problem