Metaphysics and the representational fallacy

Craig Bourne

doi:10.1093/mind/fzr005

Metaphysics and the representational fallacy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Book/Film/Article review › peer-review

Abstract

The message is clear: ‘[I]t is a fallacy to argue from facts about language to conclusions about the fundamental nature of reality, one that is widely committed’ (p. 1). Philosophers who adopt this methodology commit what Dyke calls the ‘representional fallacy’. The primary concern of metaphysics should be the investigation not of language but of reality.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1157-1161
Number of pages	5
Journal	Mind
Volume	119
Issue number	476
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzr005
Publication status	Published - Oct 2010

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title = "Metaphysics and the representational fallacy",

abstract = "The message is clear: {\textquoteleft}[I]t is a fallacy to argue from facts about language to conclusions about the fundamental nature of reality, one that is widely committed{\textquoteright} (p. 1). Philosophers who adopt this methodology commit what Dyke calls the {\textquoteleft}representional fallacy{\textquoteright}. The primary concern of metaphysics should be the investigation not of language but of reality.",

author = "Craig Bourne",

note = "Original article can be found at: http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/ Copyright Oxford University Press [Full text of this article is not available in the UHRA]",

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AB - The message is clear: ‘[I]t is a fallacy to argue from facts about language to conclusions about the fundamental nature of reality, one that is widely committed’ (p. 1). Philosophers who adopt this methodology commit what Dyke calls the ‘representional fallacy’. The primary concern of metaphysics should be the investigation not of language but of reality.

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Metaphysics and the representational fallacy

Abstract

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