Moral particularism and scientific practice

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Abstract

Particularism is usually understood as a position in moral philosophy. In fact, it is a view about all reasons, not only moral reasons. Here, I show that particularism is a familiar and controversial position in the philosophy of science and mathematics. I then argue for particularism with respect to scientific and mathematical reasoning. This has a bearing on moral particularism, because if particularism about moral reasons is true, then particularism must be true with respect to reasons of any sort, including mathematical and scientific reasons.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)492-507
JournalMetaphilosophy
Volume39
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008

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