Abstract
Recent significant research in a number of disciplines centers on the concept of the sense of agency. Because many of these studies cut across disciplinary lines there is good reason to seek a clear consensus on what ‘sense of agency’ means. In this paper I indicate some complexities that this consensus might have to deal with. I also highlight an important phenomenological distinction that needs to be considered in any discussion of the sense of agency, regardless of how it gets defined. Finally, I suggest that the sense of agency has an ambiguous phenomenology and I offer some critical comments on current models that fail to notice this ambiguity.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 15-31 |
Journal | New Ideas in Psychology |
Volume | 30 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2011 |
Keywords
- sense of agency
- F-intention
- P-intention
- intentional aspect
- motor control
- phenomenology