Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critique

Shaun Gallagher

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

169 Citations (Scopus)


This paper argues that Frith's (1992) account of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia in terms of a disruption of metarepresentational self-monitoring is inadequate in several specific ways. More generally, this paper argues against top-down explanations for the loss of the sense of agency in such symptoms. In addition, even if delusions of control might be explained by problems involved in motor control mechanisms involving efference copy and comparators, there are good reasons why the same model cannot explain thought insertion. In place of such neurocognitive explanations, the author develops a neurophenomenological explanation for the loss of the sense of agency and the misattribution of actions and thoughts to others in such symptoms.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)8-19
Number of pages12
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2004


  • Cognition Disorders
  • Delusions
  • Humans
  • Internal-External Control
  • Models, Psychological
  • Schizophrenia
  • Schizophrenic Psychology
  • Self Psychology


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