Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind

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Abstract

With reference to Chalmers's taxonomy of combination problems, I argue that while the subject combination problem reveals panpsychism as ultimately theoretically unmotivated, a rival neutral monist/panprotopsychist theory known as 'panqualityism' is much better placed to solve Chalmers's combination problems. In the final section I defend panqualityism against Chalmers's objection that it fails because of the possibility of 'awareness zombies'. I conclude that, in view of the advantages panpsychism and panqualityism share with respect to more mainstream theories of mind, panqualityism is our best hope for solving the problem of consciousness.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPanpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives
EditorsGodehard Bruntrup, Ludwig Jaskolla
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP)
Pages249-282
Number of pages34
ISBN (Print)9780199359943
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 Nov 2016

Publication series

NamePhilosophy of Mind Series
PublisherOxford University Press

Keywords

  • philosophy of mind
  • panpsychism
  • non-reductive naturalism
  • critique of dualism
  • critique of physicalism

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