TY - JOUR
T1 - 'Predicative minds: The social ontogeny of propositional thinking'. Radu J. Bogdan. MIT Press. 2009.
AU - Hutto, D.
N1 - "The definitive publisher-authenticated version of Hutto, D. (2010) ‘Review of 'Predicative minds : the social ontogeny of propositional thinking, by Bogdan, R.J.’ Mind 119 (476) pp.1141 - 1145 is available online at: http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/" [Full text of this review is not available in the UHRA]
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - To predicate is to attribute one represented item of another—for example, to say of a book that it is exciting. Only human minds are predicative minds. But we are not natural-born predicators; we become so by a process of socialization into linguistic practices. That is the central hypothesis of this book. The book is divided into three parts. The first sets the stage, introducing a problem with all existing accounts of predication. Here Bogdan distinguishes acts of mere co-instantiation, in which two simultaneously represented items are held in mind together, from predication proper. He complains that traditional treatments—including those that might be provided by Fregeans, Fodorians, and Davidsonians—necessarily fall short of what is required for explaining the special sort of unity that predication requires. In a nutshell, this is because such accounts only deal with the formal and semantic features of mental representations, whereas—if Bogdan is correct—what is required is attention to the psychopragmatic features of predicative thinking as well.
AB - To predicate is to attribute one represented item of another—for example, to say of a book that it is exciting. Only human minds are predicative minds. But we are not natural-born predicators; we become so by a process of socialization into linguistic practices. That is the central hypothesis of this book. The book is divided into three parts. The first sets the stage, introducing a problem with all existing accounts of predication. Here Bogdan distinguishes acts of mere co-instantiation, in which two simultaneously represented items are held in mind together, from predication proper. He complains that traditional treatments—including those that might be provided by Fregeans, Fodorians, and Davidsonians—necessarily fall short of what is required for explaining the special sort of unity that predication requires. In a nutshell, this is because such accounts only deal with the formal and semantic features of mental representations, whereas—if Bogdan is correct—what is required is attention to the psychopragmatic features of predicative thinking as well.
U2 - 10.1093/mind/fzq084
DO - 10.1093/mind/fzq084
M3 - Book/Film/Article review
SN - 0026-4423
VL - 119
SP - 1141
EP - 1145
JO - Mind
JF - Mind
IS - 476
ER -