Qualities and the Galilean View

Michelle Liu

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Abstract

It is often thought that sensible qualities such as colours do not exist as properties of physical objects. Focusing on the case of colour, I discuss two views: the Galilean view, according to which colours do not exist as qualities of physical objects, and the naïve view, according to which colours are, as our perception presents them to be, qualities instantiated by physical objects. I argue that it is far from clear that the Galilean view is better than the naïve view. Given the arguments in this paper, the naïve view ought to be taken seriously. The discussion here appeals especially to theorists who, like Goff, are already convinced that the quantitative language of physical science fails to capture all qualities.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)147-162
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Consciousness Studies
Volume28
Issue number9-10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 28 Sept 2021

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