Abstract
According to Wittgenstein, our spontaneous utterances are not descriptions, but expressions more akin to behaviour than to language: a new sort of speech-act. Rather than conventional performatory words, spontaneous utterances are deeds through their very spontaneity. This gives language a new dimension of reflex, which, as I argue against Peter Hacker, makes the boundary porous between the categories of language and of action, thus dissolving the gap between mind and body
| Translated title of the contribution | When words are deeds: Wittgenstein's 'spontaneous utterances and the dissolution of the mind-body problem |
|---|---|
| Original language | French |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-17 |
| Journal | Revue de theologie et de philosophie |
| Volume | 137 |
| Publication status | Published - 2005 |
Keywords
- Wittgenstein, spontaneous utterances, mind-body problem, speech-act