Abstract
This paper addresses the objections, Genia Schönbaumsfeld makes in The Illusion of Doubt, to my view of hinge certainty as a 'certainty', as nonepistemic, nonpropositional and animal. It also addresses her related dissatisfaction with Wittgenstein's notion of 'the groundlessness of our believing'.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 143–158 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | International Journal for the Study of Skepticism |
Volume | 11 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 29 Oct 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 29 Oct 2019 |
Keywords
- Wittgenstein
- Hinge Epistemology
- Basic Beliefs
- On Certainty