TY - JOUR
T1 - Swinburne on thought and consciousness
AU - Coates, Paul
N1 - “The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com”. Copyright Springer. DOI: 10.1007/BF00646457 [Full text of this article is not available in the UHRA]
PY - 1987
Y1 - 1987
N2 - Some years ago H. H. Price put forward a dispositional account of thinking, suggesting that we are never directly aware of our thoughts as such, and claiming that we are, at most, conscious of inner word images (auditory images) that express the thoughts we have. In a recent article in this journal, R. Swinburne has taken issue with Price's view, and offered an alternative account of the nature of thought. Although there is much in Swinburne's paper that is interesting and with which I find myself in agreement, I would like to argue here that he is mistaken in his central contention; and in arguing this I would like to defend a modified version of Price's theory. [opening paragraph]
AB - Some years ago H. H. Price put forward a dispositional account of thinking, suggesting that we are never directly aware of our thoughts as such, and claiming that we are, at most, conscious of inner word images (auditory images) that express the thoughts we have. In a recent article in this journal, R. Swinburne has taken issue with Price's view, and offered an alternative account of the nature of thought. Although there is much in Swinburne's paper that is interesting and with which I find myself in agreement, I would like to argue here that he is mistaken in his central contention; and in arguing this I would like to defend a modified version of Price's theory. [opening paragraph]
U2 - 10.1007/BF00646457
DO - 10.1007/BF00646457
M3 - Article
SN - 0031-8116
VL - 52
SP - 227
EP - 238
JO - Philosophical Studies
JF - Philosophical Studies
IS - 2
ER -