The Animal in Epistemology: Wittgenstein's Enactivist Solution to the Problem of Regress

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Abstract

In this paper I briefly summarize the nature of Wittgenstein's 'hinge certainties', showing how they radically differ from traditional basic beliefs in their being nonepistemic, grammatical, nonpropositional and enacted. I claim that it is these very features that enable hinge certainties to put a logical stop to justification, and thereby solve the regress problem of basic beliefs. This is a ground-breaking achievement – worthy of calling On Certainty Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece'. As I go along, I question some differing interpretations and respond to some objections from fellow-readers of On Certainty: Duncan Pritchard, Michael Williams and Crispin Wright.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)97-119
Number of pages23
JournalInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Volume6
Issue number2-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 23 May 2016

Keywords

  • Wittgenstein
  • Epistemology
  • Certainty

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