In this paper I briefly summarize the nature of Wittgenstein's 'hinge certainties', showing how they radically differ from traditional basic beliefs in their being nonepistemic, grammatical, nonpropositional and enacted. I claim that it is these very features that enable hinge certainties to put a logical stop to justification, and thereby solve the regress problem of basic beliefs. This is a ground-breaking achievement – worthy of calling On Certainty Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece'. As I go along, I question some differing interpretations and respond to some objections from fellow-readers of On Certainty: Duncan Pritchard, Michael Williams and Crispin Wright.
|Title of host publication||Hinge Epistemology|
|Editors||Annalisa Coliva, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock|
|Publisher||Brill Academic Publishers|
|Number of pages||47|
|Publication status||Published - 1 Oct 2016|