The body in social context: Some qualifications on the ‘warmth and intimacy’ of bodily self-consciousness

In this paper I examine William James’ concept of the ‘warmth and intimacy’
of bodily self-consciousness and relate it to recent attempts to recast bodily selfconsciousness in strictly neural terms. James takes bodily ‘warmth and intimacy’
to solve a number of problems related to the material and spiritual aspects of
self and personal identity. He mentions but does not fully explore the possible
disruptions in the bodily sense of ownership that can come about as the result
of experimental and pathological circumstances, and that would have to qualify
such solutions. I argue that an explanation in strictly neuroscientifi c terms does
no better in accounting for bodily self-consciousness. Both James and proponents
of the ‘body-in-the-brain’ theory ignore the social aspects of the self and the role
they play in accounting for bodily self-consciousness and its various disruptions.