TY - JOUR
T1 - The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised
AU - Allo, P.
N1 - “The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com” Copyright Springer
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - The logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.
AB - The logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.
U2 - 10.1007/s11098-010-9516-1
DO - 10.1007/s11098-010-9516-1
M3 - Article
SN - 0031-8116
VL - 153
SP - 417
EP - 434
JO - Philosophical Studies
JF - Philosophical Studies
IS - 3
ER -