TY - JOUR
T1 - The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk psychology
AU - Hutto, D.
N1 - The original article can be found at: http://journals.cambridge.org/--Copyright The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors & Cambridge University Press DOI : 10.1017/S1358246107000033
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed. This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there have been interesting recent debates about how we should understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that, at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and desires.
AB - Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed. This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there have been interesting recent debates about how we should understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that, at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and desires.
U2 - 10.1017/S1358246107000033
DO - 10.1017/S1358246107000033
M3 - Article
SN - 1358-2461
VL - 82
SP - 43
EP - 68
JO - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements
JF - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements
ER -