Abstract
Executive remuneration has been a contentious issue in the UK since the early 1990s. The lack of link between executive pay and company performance has been the shareholder’s concern. The law makes no provisions on how executive remuneration should be determine, rather it takes a corrective approach when executive pay levels are high through remuneration disclosure requirement, shareholder vote, and other remedies available to the shareholders. The effectiveness of the role of the law to influence executive remuneration pay setting is examined in this study. The study found that firstly, disclosure requirements tends to favour high executive remuneration levels. Secondly, shareholders are not using the voting powers vested on them to influence the remuneration setting process. Finally, the courts are reluctant to interfere in executive remuneration setting process. This indicates that the role of the law is unable to influence the pay setting process and curb excessive executive pay
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Procs Annual International Conference on Law, Economics and Politics |
| Subtitle of host publication | AICLEP 2014 |
| Publisher | FLE Learning Ltd |
| Pages | 29-39 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-0-9930368-0-4 |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
| Event | Annual Int Conf on Law, Economics and Politics (AICLEP 2014) - Oxford, United Kingdom Duration: 1 Sept 2014 → 3 Sept 2014 |
Conference
| Conference | Annual Int Conf on Law, Economics and Politics (AICLEP 2014) |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | United Kingdom |
| City | Oxford |
| Period | 1/09/14 → 3/09/14 |