Truly enactive emotion

Daniel Hutto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)
121 Downloads (Pure)


Any adequate account of emotion must accommodate the fact that emotions, even those of the most basic kind, exhibit intentionality as well as phenomenality. This article argues that a good place to start in providing such an account is by adjusting Prinz’s (2004) embodied appraisal theory (EAT) of emotions. EAT appeals to teleosemantics in order to account for the world-directed content of embodied appraisals. Although the central idea behind EAT is essentially along the right lines, as it stands Prinz’s proposal needs tweaking in a number of ways. This article focuses on one—the need to free it from its dependence on teleosemantics. EAT, so modified, becomes compatible with a truly enactivist understanding of basic emotions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)176-181
JournalEmotion Review
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2012


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