Abstract
This paper proposes and evaluates a new bipartite post-quantum digital signature protocol based on Winternitz chains and an oracle. Mutually mistrustful Alice and Bob are able to agree and sign a series of documents in a way that makes it impossible (within the assumed security model) to repudiate their signatures. The number of signatures supported by a single public key is still limited, though by a large number. However, the security of the signature scheme is not diminished by repeated application, so when the capacity of a public key is exhausted the last transaction can be used to agree a new key. Some ramifications are discussed, security parameters evaluated and an application area delineated for the proposed concept.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Article number | 34 |
Pages (from-to) | 1-17 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Cybersecurity |
Volume | 7 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 4 Apr 2024 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 4 Apr 2024 |
Keywords
- Signature protocol
- Post-quantum
- Hash-based signature