X-Phi and the challenge from ad hoc concepts

Michelle Liu

doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04149-8

X-Phi and the challenge from ad hoc concepts

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Ad hoc concepts feature prominently in lexical pragmatics. A speaker can use a word or phrase to communicate an ad hoc concept that is different from the lexically encoded concept and the hearer can construct the intended ad hoc concept pragmatically during utterance comprehension. I argue that some philosophical concepts have origins as ad hoc concepts, and such concepts pose a challenge for experimental philosophy regarding these concepts. To illustrate this, I consider philosophers’ ‘what-it’s-like’-concepts and experimental philosophy of consciousness.

Original language	English
Number of pages	25
Journal	Synthese
Volume	201
Issue number	5
Early online date	3 May 2023
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04149-8
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 3 May 2023

Keywords

Original Research
Ad hoc concepts
What it’s like
Lexical pragmatics
Consciousness
Experimental philosophy

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10.1007/s11229-023-04149-8Licence: CC BY

Final_Version
© Crown 2023. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, to view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Final published version, 353 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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X-Phi and the challenge from ad hoc concepts

Abstract

Keywords

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