University of Hertfordshire

By the same authors

From Deed to Word: gapless and kink-free Enactivism

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Standard

From Deed to Word: gapless and kink-free Enactivism. / Moyal-Sharrock, Daniele.

Certainty in Action: Wittgenstein on Language, Mind and Epistemoloy. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021. p. 145-176.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Harvard

Moyal-Sharrock, D 2021, From Deed to Word: gapless and kink-free Enactivism. in Certainty in Action: Wittgenstein on Language, Mind and Epistemoloy. Bloomsbury Publishing, pp. 145-176. <https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/certainty-in-action-9781350071292/>

APA

Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2021). From Deed to Word: gapless and kink-free Enactivism. In Certainty in Action: Wittgenstein on Language, Mind and Epistemoloy (pp. 145-176). Bloomsbury Publishing. https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/certainty-in-action-9781350071292/

Vancouver

Moyal-Sharrock D. From Deed to Word: gapless and kink-free Enactivism. In Certainty in Action: Wittgenstein on Language, Mind and Epistemoloy. Bloomsbury Publishing. 2021. p. 145-176

Author

Moyal-Sharrock, Daniele. / From Deed to Word: gapless and kink-free Enactivism. Certainty in Action: Wittgenstein on Language, Mind and Epistemoloy. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021. pp. 145-176

Bibtex

@inbook{5579b3b2e66a4d3baff28fca7f55455a,
title = "From Deed to Word: gapless and kink-free Enactivism",
abstract = "In their most recent book, Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content (MIT 2017), Dan Hutto and Eric Myin claim to give a complete and gapless naturalistic account of cognition, but it comes with a kink. The kink being that content-involving cognition has special properties found nowhere else in nature, making it the case that minds capable of contentful thought differ in kind, in this key respect, from more basic minds. Contra Hutto and Myin, I argue that content-involving practices are themselves simply a further extension of action and do not therefore warrant being called 'different in kind' or 'kinky'. With the help of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John V. Canfield, I show that Enactivism meets the challenge of explaining higher-level cognition; and, contra continuity sceptics, offers 'a philosophically cogent and empirically respectable account' of how human minds can emerge from nonhuman minds. ",
author = "Daniele Moyal-Sharrock",
year = "2021",
month = apr,
day = "22",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781350071308",
pages = "145--176",
booktitle = "Certainty in Action",
publisher = "Bloomsbury Publishing",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - From Deed to Word: gapless and kink-free Enactivism

AU - Moyal-Sharrock, Daniele

PY - 2021/4/22

Y1 - 2021/4/22

N2 - In their most recent book, Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content (MIT 2017), Dan Hutto and Eric Myin claim to give a complete and gapless naturalistic account of cognition, but it comes with a kink. The kink being that content-involving cognition has special properties found nowhere else in nature, making it the case that minds capable of contentful thought differ in kind, in this key respect, from more basic minds. Contra Hutto and Myin, I argue that content-involving practices are themselves simply a further extension of action and do not therefore warrant being called 'different in kind' or 'kinky'. With the help of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John V. Canfield, I show that Enactivism meets the challenge of explaining higher-level cognition; and, contra continuity sceptics, offers 'a philosophically cogent and empirically respectable account' of how human minds can emerge from nonhuman minds.

AB - In their most recent book, Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content (MIT 2017), Dan Hutto and Eric Myin claim to give a complete and gapless naturalistic account of cognition, but it comes with a kink. The kink being that content-involving cognition has special properties found nowhere else in nature, making it the case that minds capable of contentful thought differ in kind, in this key respect, from more basic minds. Contra Hutto and Myin, I argue that content-involving practices are themselves simply a further extension of action and do not therefore warrant being called 'different in kind' or 'kinky'. With the help of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John V. Canfield, I show that Enactivism meets the challenge of explaining higher-level cognition; and, contra continuity sceptics, offers 'a philosophically cogent and empirically respectable account' of how human minds can emerge from nonhuman minds.

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9781350071308

SP - 145

EP - 176

BT - Certainty in Action

PB - Bloomsbury Publishing

ER -