University of Hertfordshire

Hallucinations and the Transparency of Perception

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

Standard

Hallucinations and the Transparency of Perception. / Coates, Paul.

Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. ed. / F. Macpherson; D. Platchais. Cambridge: Mass : MIT Press, 2013. p. 381-398.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

Harvard

Coates, P 2013, Hallucinations and the Transparency of Perception. in F Macpherson & D Platchais (eds), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press, Cambridge: Mass, pp. 381-398.

APA

Coates, P. (2013). Hallucinations and the Transparency of Perception. In F. Macpherson, & D. Platchais (Eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology (pp. 381-398). MIT Press.

Vancouver

Coates P. Hallucinations and the Transparency of Perception. In Macpherson F, Platchais D, editors, Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge: Mass: MIT Press. 2013. p. 381-398

Author

Coates, Paul. / Hallucinations and the Transparency of Perception. Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. editor / F. Macpherson ; D. Platchais. Cambridge: Mass : MIT Press, 2013. pp. 381-398

Bibtex

@inbook{5eb706cc4f2b4800824b74f0b17cbcac,
title = "Hallucinations and the Transparency of Perception",
abstract = "This paper examines the way in which concepts of a low-level classificatory kind occur in different kinds of experiences, and what happens when subjects of deceptive musical hallucinations re-assess their experiences and come to realise that they are hallucinating.Drawing upon this account, it is shown how it is possible for subjects to adopt different conceptual stances with respect to veridical perceptual experience. The issue of the seeming “transparency” of perceptual experience is explored, and it is argued that the sense in which perceptual experience is transparent is compatible with the Critical Realist version of the causal theory of perception: hallucinatory phenomena show how perception can be intentionally direct, yet causally mediated. Transparency does not provide any special support for Direct Realist or Disjunctivist theories of perception.",
keywords = "Perceptual experience; transparency; hallucination; causal theory of perception; critical realism; direct realism; disjunctivism. ",
author = "Paul Coates",
year = "2013",
month = aug,
language = "English",
isbn = "9780262019200",
pages = "381--398",
editor = "F. Macpherson and D. Platchais",
booktitle = "Hallucination",
publisher = "MIT Press",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Hallucinations and the Transparency of Perception

AU - Coates, Paul

PY - 2013/8

Y1 - 2013/8

N2 - This paper examines the way in which concepts of a low-level classificatory kind occur in different kinds of experiences, and what happens when subjects of deceptive musical hallucinations re-assess their experiences and come to realise that they are hallucinating.Drawing upon this account, it is shown how it is possible for subjects to adopt different conceptual stances with respect to veridical perceptual experience. The issue of the seeming “transparency” of perceptual experience is explored, and it is argued that the sense in which perceptual experience is transparent is compatible with the Critical Realist version of the causal theory of perception: hallucinatory phenomena show how perception can be intentionally direct, yet causally mediated. Transparency does not provide any special support for Direct Realist or Disjunctivist theories of perception.

AB - This paper examines the way in which concepts of a low-level classificatory kind occur in different kinds of experiences, and what happens when subjects of deceptive musical hallucinations re-assess their experiences and come to realise that they are hallucinating.Drawing upon this account, it is shown how it is possible for subjects to adopt different conceptual stances with respect to veridical perceptual experience. The issue of the seeming “transparency” of perceptual experience is explored, and it is argued that the sense in which perceptual experience is transparent is compatible with the Critical Realist version of the causal theory of perception: hallucinatory phenomena show how perception can be intentionally direct, yet causally mediated. Transparency does not provide any special support for Direct Realist or Disjunctivist theories of perception.

KW - Perceptual experience; transparency; hallucination; causal theory of perception; critical realism; direct realism; disjunctivism.

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 9780262019200

SP - 381

EP - 398

BT - Hallucination

A2 - Macpherson, F.

A2 - Platchais, D.

PB - MIT Press

CY - Cambridge: Mass

ER -